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INTRODUCTION
In the following chapters, I will examine how three 
prominent theorists of international relations^ justify their 
conception of world order. Bull, Nardin and Beitz have each 
developed state-centric theories of world order which, they claim, 
nevertheless protect the common good of individuals within states: 
Bull argues the interests of individuals are best served by 
maintaining order among states; Nardin claims human rights 
considerations are already implicit in customary international 
law; and Beitz argues it is possible for the system of states to 
accommodate principles of justice. All three texts under 
consideration implicitly endorse the realist proposition that 
promoting order among states will ultimately serve the interests 
of the individuals within them.
I chose these three authors because although each would 
claim to have a different theory of world order, they all justify 
a conception of the world which upholds states' rights. I aim to 
show that in spite of superficial differences, each writer's 
perspective suffers the contradictions of attempting to reconcile 
a states' rights principle with the principle of promoting the 
common good. Of the three, Charles Beitz would probably be the 
most likely to object to being identified with the realist 
tradition. However, as I will demonstrate in chapter three, 
oeicz's attempt to aeveiop an alternative tneory to the realist 
position is limited by his continued acknowledgement of the prior 
rights of states.
While many other writers fall into the same category as 
Bull, Beitz and Nardin,^ I have chosen to focus on these three
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a u t h o r s  b e c a u s e  t hey  a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h r e e  do mi na n t  s t r e a m s  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  theory  and each t e x t  p rov ides  the  f u l l e s t  
e x p o s i t i o n  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  approach .  While  B u l l ' s  w r i t i n g s  a r e  
f a r  more e x t e n s i v e  than the study o f  one t e x t  might im ply ,  Bull  
s t a t e s  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  in  w r i t i n g  The Anarchical S o c i e t y  a s ,  "to 
expand s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  a v iew o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  order  th a t  I have s t a t e d  o n ly  in a p ie c em ea l  fa sh io n  
e lsew h ere" .  I t  cou ld  be argued th a t  B u l l ' s  l a t e r  works 
r e p r e s e n t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  movement away from the c e n t r a l  t h e s i s  of  
The A narchica l  S o c i e t y , however,  I c o n s id e r  t h i s  s h i f t  to  be 
p e r i p h e r a l  and B u l l ' s  b a s i c  p o s i t i o n  t o  r ema i n  t h e  same.  B u l l ' s  
p u b l i s h e d  w r i t i n g s  i n  t h e  1980s do a t t e m p t  t o  accommodate  r a t h e r  
t han  r e b u t  T h i r d  World c l a i m s  in  r e g a r d  t o  wor ld  o r d e r ,  however ,  
he c o n t i n u e s  t o  p o r t r a y  o r d e r  and j u s t i c e  a s  compe t ing  g o a l s  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  and a r g u e s  t h a t  t he  u n r e l e n t i n g  p u r s u i t  of 
j u s t i c e  j e o p a r d i s e s  o r d e r  among s t a t e s . ^
In c h o o s i n g  which  a u t h o r s  were most  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i o n ,  I s p e c i f i c a l l y  l e f t  o u t  L i n k l a t e r  and F r o s t  
i n  f a v o u r  of  B e i t z .  Whi le  L i n k l a t e r ' s  work i s  s i m i l a r  t o  B e i t z ' s  
i n  t h a t  i t  i s  a t h e o r y  o f  s t r u c t u r e  r a t h e r  than a c t i o n ,  and a r g u e s  
f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r r a l  o f  d o m e s t i c  m o r a l i t y  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  more so t h a n  B e i t z ,  L i n k l a t e r ' s  t h e o r y  i s  t o t a l l y  in 
a b s t r a c t ,  i n  l i n e  w i t h  h i s  a r g ume n t  t h a t  t h e o r i s t s  s ho u l d  s i m p l y  
uncover  t h e  "meaning and r a t i o n a l i t y "  o f  t h e  wor ld  b e f o r e  
a d v o c a t i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  form of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r . ^  B e i t z ,  in 
c o n t r a s t ,  a t t e m p t s  t o  g i v e  h i s  t h e o r y  a p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  to 
t he  e x t e n t  t h a t  he d e v e l o p s  p r i n c i p l e s  in r e g a r d  t o  t h e  i s s u e s  of
p
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  While F r o s t  i s  in the  
same " n o r m a t i v e"  g e n r e  a s  B e i t z  and L i n k l a t e r ,  he i s  more 
c on ce r ne d  t o  p r e s e n t  a d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,
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than a theory of the state in international relations.^
My critique of these theorists will evaluate the extent to 
which their claims are valid and in particular, highlight the 
problems involved in arguing that upholding states' rights 
promotes the common good. In the final chapter, I will discuss 
the difficulties which arise in attempting to construct a theory 
which reconciles the claims of individuals with those of states.
I do not agree that some theories are inherently more 
"objective" than others, or that theory can in any sense be value- 
free. Described by Hall as "one of the most profound myths in 
liberal ideology", the claim of objectivity should not distract 
our attention from the writer's normative agenda.^ Suganami
points out that Bull in particular is "hesitant to acknowledge" 
the normative character of The Anarchical Society.^ For 
political theory, knowing the authors' view of what should be is 
an important element in assessing the merits of their theoretical 
claims.
While Bull claims to "believe in the value of being detached 
or disinterested", his observation that "some approaches to the 
study of world politics are more detached or disinterested than 
others", is not borne out by his own approach. In the
introduction to The Anarchical Society, Bull states his purpose in 
writing the book as "the purely intellectual one of inquiring into 
the subject and following the argument wherever it might lead". 
However, he subsequently re-states his purpose throughout the text 
as being to "defend" a particular conception of world order 
against what he perceives as an "attack" from "universalist or 
solidarist assumptions".^ Thus Bull, in common with other
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p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s ,  i s  an a d v o c a t e  a s  w e l l  as a r e p o r t e r .
B ro ad ly  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  p u rp o se  o f  t h e o r y  i s  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  
e x p l a i n  the  w o r ld ,  on th e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  the  d i s c o u r s e  o f  th e  
s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  i s  b o t h  r e f l e c t i v e  and d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  th e  r e a l i t y  
o f  which i t  i s  a p a r t . ^  One need  n o t  a s c r i b e  t o  a n a r ro w  v iew 
o f  o b s e r v a b l e  t r u t h  to  a c c e p t  t h a t  a t h e o r i s t  can d e v e lo p  a s e r i e s  
o f  p r i n c i p l e s  o r  f o r m u la e  t h r o u g h  d e s c r i p t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  o f  
o b s e r v e d  p h e n o m e n a .^  Even i f  we a c c e p t  t h a t  a l l  meaning i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e o r i e s  sh o u ld  n e v e r t h e l s s  be a b l e  t o  w i t h s t a n d  
co m p ar i so n  w i t h  o b s e r v a b l e  e v e n t s .  The " t e s t "  o f  a t h e o r y  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  th e  e x t e n t  t o  which  i t  c o n c u r s  w i th  o n e ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
r e a l i t y  and w h e th e r  i t  i s  u s e f u l  in  p r e d i c t i n g  th e  f u t u r e
1 o
conseguences  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  e v e n t s .
While t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t c  the  r o l e  o f  t h e o r y  
in g e n e r a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  has  a f u r t h e r  d im ens ion  -  the  q u e s t  
to  d e f i n e  th e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  p o l i t i c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  f o r  mankind: 
" P o l i t i c a l  t h o u g h t  i s  i t s e l f  a form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n .
P o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e  i s  th e  s c i e n c e  n o t  o n ly  o f  what i s ,  b u t  o f  what  
ought to  be." Much o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y ,  f o r  exam ple ,
fo c u s e s  on th e  c a u s e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  among s t a t e s  in  th e  hope o f  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  how c o n f l i c t  can be m in im i s e d  or a v o id ed .
P o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  t h e r e f o r e  i n c o r p o r a t e s  a sense  o f  th e  i d e a l  a s  
w e l l  a s  th e  r e a l  in  i t s  a n a l y s e s  o f  the  w o r ld ,  c a n v a s s i n g  the  
p o s s i b l e  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  p r o b a b l e ,  in  i t s  a t t e m p t  t o  p r o v id e
p Dmeaning and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The o v e r r i d i n g  f o c u s  o f  modern p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  i s  t o  
examine th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i n c l u d i n g
p l
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  i n d i v i d u a l s  and th e  s t a t e .  Whether
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one a c c e p t s  an A r i s t o t e l i a n  o r  Hobbes ian  view o f  t h e s e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  th e  s t a t e  i s  most commonly seen to  e x i s t  f o r  the
7 7i n d i v i d u a l  and  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  p rom ote  th e  common good.
The t h e o r i e s  of  B u l l ,  N ard in  and B e i t z  i n c o r p o r a t e  s e v e r a l  
key a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  
i n d i v i d u a l s  and t h e  s t a t e  which  w i l l  be exam ined  in c h a p t e r  fo u r .  
As t h e o r i s t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  B u l l ,  Nardin  and B e i t z  do 
seek to  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  w o r ld  o r d e r  in  t e r m s  of  th e  
common good. B u l l  s u p p o r t s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  o r d e r l y  r e l a t i o n s  
among s t a t e s  in  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  " o r d e r  in  s o c i a l  l i f e  i s  d e s i r a b l e  
b ecause  i t  i s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  v a lu e s " .  
Nard in  a r g u e s  f o r  human r i g h t s  t o  be accommodated in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l a w , and B e i t z  s a y s  s t a t e s  a r e  c a p a b le  o f  a d o p t in g  a r e v i s e d  s e t  
of  r u l e s  of  a s s o c i a t i o n  which accommodate  p r i n c i p l e s  o f
y o
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e .
My e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  how B u l l ,  N ard in  and B e i t z  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  
c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  w or ld  o r d e r  in  t e r m s  o f  th e  common good sh o u ld  n o t  
be c o n fu s e d  w i t h  th e  d e b a t e  a b o u t  w h e th e r  o r d e r  i s  p r i o r  t o
y f.
j u s t i c e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Where B u l l  p o r t r a y s  o r d e r
and j u s t i c e  a s  co m p e t in g  e l e m e n t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y ,  he i s  
a c t u a l l y  d i s c u s s i n g  c o m p e t in g  c o n c e p t i o n s  of  w or ld  o r d e r ,  one 
which e m p h a s i s e s  th e  r i g h t s  o f  s t a t e s ,  and the  o t h e r  which 
e m p h a s i s e s  th e  r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .
While I have chosen  t o  o r g a n i s e  a c h a p t e r  a ro u n d  e ac h  a u t h o r  
and p r e s e n t  my own t h o u g h t s  in c h a p t e r  f o u r  i t  would have been 
c o n c e i v a b l e  t o  o r g a n i s e  eac h  c h a p t e r  a l o n g  t h e m a t i c  l i n e s .  I 
d e c id e d  t o  f o c u s  on e a c h  a u t h o r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  in  o r d e r  t o  d e v e lo p  
the  f u l l e s t  p o s s i b l e  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p o s i t i o n s .  As
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e ac h  a u t h o r  c l a i m s  to  p r e s e n t  a d i f f e r e n t  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r d e r ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  dem onstrate  how each th eory  i s  
d e v e lo p e d  a s  a whole  t o  expose  i t s  i n h e r e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  and to  
a v o i d  t h e  a c c u s a t i o n  o f  s e l e c t i v e  r e a s o n i n g .
N e i t h e r  B u l l ,  Nardin nor B e i t z  o f f e r  a working d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
the s t a t e  in  any o f  the  th ree  t e x t s .  As t h i s  lack  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  
p o ses  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o b le m s  f o r  th e  t h r e e  t h e o r i e s  under  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  I w i l l  endeavour to  approach a working d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  the  s t a t e  a s  I d e v e lo p  my c r i t i q u e .  However a t  t h e  o u t s e t  I 
would l i k e  t o  r e s o l v e  any c o n f u s i o n  a r o u s e d  by th e  p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the  s t a t e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  In th e  ab se n c e  o f  a 
more c o m p re h e n s iv e  d e f i n i t i o n ,  we sh o u ld  a t  l e a s t  acknowledge  t h a t  
a l l  s t a t e s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a head  o f  s t a t e  in th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a r e n a ,  so  where  one r e f e r s  t o  a s t a t e ' s  a c t i o n s ,  one i s  a c t u a l l y  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  a head o f  s t a t e .  Whether th e  head of 
s t a t e  i s  an i n d i v i d u a l ,  an e l e c t e d  government ,  o r  th e  p r o d u c t  of 
some o t h e r  form of  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s ,  a l l  s t a t e s  p o s s e s s  one,  and 
f o r  th e  p u r p o s e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y ,  the head o f  s t a t e  i s  the  
"person"  t o  whom a s t a t e ' s  a c t i o n s  sh o u ld  be a t t r i b u t e d .
To a t t e m p t  t o  d e f i n e  " th e  common good" in t e r m s  of  a
s p e c i f i c  p r i n c i p l e  would d e t r a c t  from the  c e n t r a l  o b j e c t i v e  of
t h i s  t h e s i s  -  t o  exam ine  how t h r e e  t h e o r i s t s  j u s t i f y  t h e i r
c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  w o r ld  o r d e r .  B u l l ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  d e f i n e s  t h e s e
goods a s  t h e  " g o a l s "  o f  s e c u r i t y  o f  human l i f e ,  s a n c t i t y  of
c o n t r a c t s ,  and  s t a b i l i t y  of  p o s s e s s i o n ,  w i th o u t  which  "we can n o t
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speak o f  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s o c i e t y  o r  of  s o c i a l  l i f e " .
However, a s  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  th e  "good l i f e "  encompass  a wide range  
o f  "goods",  from the  m i n i m i s a t i o n  o f  v i o l e n c e  t o  th e  p r o v i s i o n  of 
economic  s e c u r i t y ,  I f a v o u r  th e  b r o a d e s t  p o s s i b l e  d e f i n i t i o n .
6
Brown's definition that "the good life is one which involves all 
the basic goods to the proper extent", and "the good society is 
one which promotes such lives, at least as a prime objective" is 
a sufficient starting point to review the argument that an order 
based on recognising the rights of states promotes the common good 
of individuals within them.
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CHAPTER ONE
AN "INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY" CONCEPTION OF WORLD ORDER
Hedley Bull's conception of order in The Anarchical Society/ 
is based on two apparently contradictory principles. On the one 
hand, Bull claims every state has a fundamental right to autonomy, 
while on the other hand, he endorses the right of Great Powers to 
intervene in other state's affairs, ie. to "exploit their 
preponderance in such a way as to impart a central direction to 
the affairs of international society as a whole".^ Bull 
reconciles these two principles by portraying the state as capable 
of exercising "rights and responsibilities" within "international 
society".
Order in "international society" is maintained by a pecking 
order among states dominated by the Great Powers. Bull draws on 
the historical record to prove that this pecking order goes hand 
in hand with order in the system of states, and therefore argues 
that international society protects individuals within states by 
minimising the level of conflict between states in the 
international arena.
1.1 Order in "International Society"
Bull claims that the application of the state of nature 
analogy to international relations has led many theorists to the 
conclusion that in the absence of a common power to enforce 
international order, relations between states are in a constant 
state of war. Bull denies that international society is a state 
of nature, while at the same time denying that the world resembles
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domestic political society. Instead, his "international 
society" conception of international order falls somewhere between 
the two.^
The "international society" conception of international 
relations is based on the perception that the system of states 
possesses a significant degree of internal order. This element 
of order among states is not imposed from above, but is reflected 
in the way states conduct themselves in relation to each other.
The fact that all states have a common interest in self- 
preservation, Bull claims, translates to a common interest in the 
preservation of international society. The evidence of this 
common interest is in the way states observe innumerable, often 
unstated rules and institutions in their conduct with other 
sta tes.
Bull argues that states are committed to promoting orderly 
relations with one another. Therefore order is maintained in 
international society by the sense of a common interest among 
states; through the rules of coexistence; and through the 
protection of these rules by international institutions.^
In explaining why states would feel they have a common 
interest in self-preservation, Bull employs the analogy of an 
individual's natural desire to seek peaceful coexistence. "The 
maintenance of order in international society has as its starting- 
point the development among states of a sense of common interests 
in the elementary goals of social life".^7 These are the goals of 
"life, truth, and property" which are fundamental to any order 
among human beings, in the sense that "...a constellation of 
persons or groups among whom there existed no expectation of
"5
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security against violence (life), of the honouring of agreements 
(truth) or of stability of possession (property), we should hardly
pcall a society at all".
The universal goals of life, truth and property, whether 
applying to states or individuals, need not be enshrined in 
positive law to be effective, since "order in social life can 
exist in principle without rules and ... it is best to treat rules 
as a widespread, and nearly ubiquitous, means of creating order in 
human society, rather than as part of the definition of order 
itself".^
Evidence of states believing in the goal of coexistence is 
demonstrated by their acceptance of the rules which place 
restrictions on state behaviour. Like individuals, states obey 
rules which reflect the universal goals of all social life - rules 
regulating the conduct of war (life); upholding the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda (truth); and respecting the principle of state 
sovereignty (property).^
The rules are in turn "protected" by the five institutions 
through which states pursue their own goals in international 
society - the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war 
and the Great Powers.^
Bull does not see order for order's sake as the ultimate 
goal of international society, nor is the preservation of the 
society of states the sole purpose of international society, for 
"states are simply groupings of men, and men may be grouped in 
such a way that they do not form states at all". The goal of 
order among states is subservient to the higher goal of "world
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order" which "sustain(s) the elementary or primary goals of social 
life among mankind as a whole". Upholding states' rights is
only justifiable to the extent that it is "instrumental to the 
goal of order in human society as a whole".^
World order is more fundamental and primordial than 
international order because the ultimate units of the great 
society of all mankind are not states (or nations, tribes, 
empires, classes or parties) but individual human beings, 
which are permanent and indestructible in a sense in whictjv 
groupings of them of this or that sort are not.
Although the "international society" conception of order 
should serve the "higher" goal of world order, its potential to do 
so is nevertheless indirect because it upholds the rights of 
states over the rights of individuals. While Bull admits the 
"international society" conception of world order may not seem to 
take sufficient account of justice considerations, he argues that 
maintaining order between states is the best means of promoting 
justice for individuals within them.^
...if there is not a certain minimum of security against 
violence, respect for undertakings and stability of rules of 
property, goals of political, social and economic justice 
for individual men or of a just distribution of burdens and 
rewards in relation to the world common good can have no ._ 
meaning.
Explaining the apparent contradiction in attempting to 
reconcile the principle of respecting states' rights with the 
principle of Great Power dominance, Bull argues first, that the 
attitudes of certain states pose more of a threat to international 
order than others, and second, that the Great Powers are capable 
of exercising restraint in their relations with one another in the 
interests of promoting international order.
...to the extent that the framework of international order 
is a strong one, it is able to withstand the shock of
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violent assaults carried out in the name of 'justice'. At 
the present time, for example, the nuclear peace has made 
the world safe for just wars of national liberation, carried 
out at the sub-nuclear level, and the international or 
interstate peace has made the world safe for just internals 
and civil violence.
1.2 Threats to International Order
Bull argues against allowing individuals to make claims 
outside the boundaries of the state on the grounds that to do so 
would pose a serious threat to international order.
...the idea of the rights of the individual human being 
raises in international politics the question of the right 
and duty of persons and groups other than the state to which 
he owes allegience to come to his aid in the event that his 
rights are being disregarded - the right of the Western 
Powers to protect the political rights of the citizens of 
Eastern European countries, of Africans to protect the 
rights of black South Africans, or of China to protect the 
right of Chinese minorities in South-east Asia. These are 
questions which, answered in a certain way, lead to disorder 
in international relations, or even to the breakdown ofQ 
international society itself.
So how does Bull see justice as being achieved in the
"international society" conception of order? First, claims for
justice must be articulated by a state, or by a representative of
a state. However, as "universal ideologies that are espoused by
20states are notoriously subservient to their special interests", 
the claims for justice must also be supported by a consensus in 
the society of states. Bull cites agreement among states on 
decolonisation in Africa and Asia as an example of how a principle 
can be gradually accepted by the society of states, and ultimately 
receive universal legitimacy. He also offers the hypothetical 
example that if "there were a consensus within the United Nations, 
including all the great powers, in favour of military intervention 
in South Africa to enforce national self-determination for black 
majority populations and to uphold black African political rights,
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i t  m igh t  be p o s s i b l e  t o  r e g a r d  such  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a s  im p ly in g  no
o 2
th re a t  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d er . . ."
T h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  B u l l ' s  t h e o r y  a b o u t  how 
order in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  has come about -  through an 
in form al  s e t  of  r u l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  which acqu ire  v a l i d i t y  once 
the m a j o r i t y  of  s t a t e s  f e e l  i t  would be in  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  to  
a d h e r e  t o  them. One would t h e r e f o r e  e x p e c t  any c l a i m  f o r  j u s t i c e  
to  be a c c e p t a b le  i f  i t  met the above c r i t e r i a ,  i e .  was a r t i c u l a t e d  
by a s t a t e  and a c c e p t e d  by the  s o c i e t y  o f  s t a t e s .  In t e r m s  of  
B u l l ' s  c r i t e r i a ,  any c l a i m  f o r  j u s t i c e ,  w h e th e r  i t  be th e  c l a im  
f o r  a New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic O r d e r ,  o r  c l a i m s  f o r  u n i v e r s a l  
human r i g h t s ,  c o u ld  r e c e i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e x p r e s s i o n  a s  long  a s  i t  
was i n t r o d u c e d  by a s t a t e ,  and s u p p o r t e d  by a c o n se n s u s  of  s t a t e s .
But B u l l  i n s i s t s  t h a t  any id ea  which  i s  n o t  a l r e a d y  p a r t  of
the  "consensus"  among s t a t e s  i s  a t h r e a t  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .
B u l l  a r g u e s  t h a t  i d e a s  which a r e  n o t  a l r e a d y  s u p p o r t e d  by a
c o n se n s u s  among s t a t e s  a r e  a t h r e a t  t o  w o r ld  o r d e r ,  b ecau se  "when
demands f o r  j u s t i c e  a r e  p u t  f o r w a r d  in  th e  absence  of a c o n sen su s
w i t h i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  a s  t o  what j u s t i c e  i n v o l v e s ,  the
p r o s p e c t  i s  opened up t h a t  the  c o n s e n s u s  which does  e x i s t  a b o u t
23o r d e r  o r  minimum c o e x i s t e n c e  w i l l  be undone".
B u l l  f a i l s  t o  e x p l a i n  why th e  b a s i s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  
cou ld  be unde rm ined  by th e  absence  o f  a g r e e m e n t  among s t a t e s  on an 
i s s u e  l i k e  j u s t i c e ,  when s t a t e s  d i s a g r e e  on in n u m e ra b le  o t h e r  
i s s u e s ,  none of  w h ich  a r e  a t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .  By 
B u l l ' s  own d e f i n i t i o n ,  u n t i l  an i s s u e  i s  a c c e p t e d  by s t a t e s ,  i t  
c an n o t  r e c e i v e  p o l i t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n  in th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r e n a ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  n o t  pose a t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .
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The o n ly  way in which a s t a t e  c o u ld  t h r e a t e n  the  e x i s t i n g  
"consensus"  would be i f  s t a t e s  who a r e  members o f  the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  sys tem  were  p r e p a r e d  to  undermine  i t .
B u l l  b e l i e v e s  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  would be p r e p a r e d  t o  underm ine  
th e  p r e s e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  in  t h a t  "w hereas  the  W es te rn  
p o w e rs ,  i n  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  th e y  o f f e r  o f  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s ,  show 
t h e m s e l v e s  t o  be p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  o r d e r ,  the  s t a t e s  o f  the  
T h i r d  World a r e  p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  th e  a c h ie v e m e n t  o f  
j u s t i c e  in  th e  wor ld  communi ty ,  even  a t  th e  p r i c e  of d i s o r d e r " . ^
B u l l ' s  f e a r s  would a p p e a r  t o  be m i s p l a c e d ,  i f  we u n d e r s t a n d  
h i s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  a s  r e s t i n g  on: 1) a s en se
of  common i n t e r e s t  among s t a t e s  in p r e s e r v i n g  th e  s o c i e t y  o f  
s t a t e s :  2) th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  r u l e s  which  r e c o g n i s e  the  l i m i t a t i o n
of  war ,  t h e  keep in g  o f  p r o m i s e s ,  and th e  r i g h t  t o  s o v e r e i g n t y ;  and 
3) i n s t i t u t i o n s  which f a c i l i t a t e  th e  p u r s u i t  of s t a t e s '  own g o a l s  
in  an e n v i r o n m e n t  of p e a c e f u l  c o e x i s t e n c e .  Al l  of the  above 
p l a c e  a p r i m a r y  v a lu e  on th e  r i g h t s  o f  s t a t e s .  So any s t a t e  which 
t r i e d  t o  underm ine  the  b a s i s  o f  o r d e r  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y ,  
would e f f e c t i v e l y  be u n d e rm in in g  i t s e l f .
There  i s  no e v id e n c e  o f  any d e c l i n e  in  the  p o p u l a r i t y  o f  the  
s t a t e  a s  an i n s t i t u t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the  T h i r d  World. T h i r d  
World l e a d e r s  a r e  th e  mos t  v o c a l  s u p p o r t e r s  of th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  and a r e  th e  a l s o  th e  most  w i l l i n g  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
i s s u e s  l i k e  human r i g h t s  a r e  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  co n ce rn s .  Nor do 
c l a i m s  f o r  a New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Order  pose a t h r e a t  t o  the  
s t a t e s - r i g h t s  p r i n c i p l e .  The NIEO was a r t i c u l a t e d  by s t a t e s ,  f o r  
s t a t e s ,  and the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w e a l t h  demanded under the  NIEO 
i m p l i e s  no d e p a r t u r e  from th e  p r i n c i p l e  which r e c o g n i s e s  t h e  s t a t e
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as the primary bearer of rights and responsibilities in 
international society.
The reason Bull sees states of the Third World as a threat 
to international order, is because the "international society" 
conception of order is not based on a states' rights principle, 
but on a principle which defends the dominance of the Great 
Powers. Bull's portrayal of his "international society" 
conception of world order in terms of a states-rights principle is 
an attempt to disguise his endorsement of the dominance of the 
Great Powers. Bull's theory does not offer any understanding of 
how change will occur, either within states, or through the 
actions of states in the international arena because his theory is 
simply a defence of the status quo.
It could however be argued that a defence of the status quo 
is the best means of promoting international order, and this will 
be examined below.
1.3 The Great Powers as Guardians of International Order
While independence of outside authority and the control of 
one's territory and population is a fundamental right of states, 
they enjoy sovereignty in name only, the rights of states being 
overridden by power politics. Bull admits that state sovereignty 
is a nominal sovereignty but argues that the inequality of states 
is a positive force for international order. By facilitating the 
rise of Great Powers, the inequality of states has the effect of 
"simplifying" the pattern of international relations, enabling 
anyone "contemplating the vast and amorphous world body politic, 
to distinguish the relations among the great powers as its
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n cessential skeleton". While Bull admits "international order
sustained by the great powers does not provide equal justice for
nrall states", he counters with the observation that the only 
possible alternative to the present Great Power balance would be 
"one in which these custodians and guarantors are replaced by 
others".^
Bull cites the greatest threat to order and justice in the world 
as the breakdown of the present order among states into a
o o"Hobbesian State of War". He claims that the present Great 
Power balance has reduced the likelihood of war in international 
society.
...in international politics at the present time, the role 
of war, at least in the strict sense of interstate or 
international war, appears more closely circumscribed than,, 
before the end of the Second World War.
Bull attributes this success in part to the direction
imposed on international relations by the nuclear balance between
the Great Powers. While war in the present time "has not been
robbed of its historic political functions... the range of
political functions it can serve has become narrower, the costs of
10resorting to it greater".
Although war is one of Bull's five institutions of order, 
its effectiveness depends upon the outcome of war never being 
absolute. As such, war is an instrument of change in 
international society with a "dual aspect". On the one hand, it 
is a "manifestation of disorder in international society, bringing 
with it the threat of breakdown of international society 
itself". On the other hand, war is used by states as an
instrument of policy, and is thus a positive force for order on
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y .
From th e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  of the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s y s t e m ,  the  
s i n g l e  mechanism o r  f i e l d  of f o r c e s  which s t a t e s  c o n s t i t u t e  
t o g e t h e r  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  one a n o t h e r ,  
war a p p e a r s  a s  a b a s i c  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  the  shape the  sys tam 
a s s u m e s  a t  any  one t im e .
T o g e t h e r  w i t h  th e  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  
war t h e r e f o r e  p l a y s  a p o s i t i v e  r o l e  in the  m a in ten an ce  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .  The i n s t i t u t i o n  of the  b a l a n c e  o f  power,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  r e d u c e s  th e  i n c i d e n c e  of war,  by p o s tp o n in g  the  
o u t b r e a k  o f  c o n f l i c t  u n t i l  i t  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  u n a v o id a b l e .  The
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law and d ip lom acy ,  in t u r n ,  a s s i s t  
in  p r e s e r v i n g  the  b a l a n c e  o f  power by m a i n t a i n i n g  th e  maximum 
d e g r e e  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  b e tw een  s t a t e s . A n d  f i n a l l y ,  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  G r e a t  Power dominance m in im ise s  th e  u n n e c e s s a r y  
o u t b r e a k  o f  war by im p o s in g  a c e n t r a l  d i r e c t i o n  on the  a f f a i r s  of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  a s  a whole.
War t h e r e f o r e  p r o v i d e s  the  u l t i m a t e  p r e s s u r e  v a lv e  t o  
r e l i e v e  s t a t e  r i v a l r y ,  b u t  i t s  v a lu e  depends  upon the  outcome of 
war n e v e r  b e i n g  a b s o l u t e .
The r u l e s  and  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  has  
e v o l v e d  r e f l e c t  th e  t e n s i o n  be tween  the  p e r c e p t i o n  of  war as  
a t h r e a t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  which must be c o n t a i n e d ,  
and t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  i t  a s  an i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  which ^
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  can e x p l o i t  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  pu rp o se .  b
In  t h e  p a s t ,  war has  been an e s s e n t i a l  p r e s s u r e  v a lv e  f o r  
th e  b a l a n c e  of power b e tw ee n  s t a t e s  because  c f  th e  t e n d e n c y  of  
s t a t e s  t o  work t h e m s e l v e s  i n t o  a " s im p le  b a lan c e "  of two oppos ing  
power b l o c s .  Burns  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  the  most s t a b l e  b a l a n c e  of  
power s i t u a t i o n  i s  one when t h e r e  i s  a " m u l t i p l e  b a la n c e "  o f  
s t a t e s ,  r o u g h l y  e q u a l  in  s t r e n g t h ,  and "not r e a d i l y  d i v i s i b l e  i n t o
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two e q u a l  s i d e s " ,  such  a s  the  s i t u a t i o n  in p o s t - N a p e o l e o n i c  
Europe f o l l o w i n g  th e  C o n g re s s  o f  Vienna.  But m u l t i p l e  b a l a n c e s
n e v e r  seem to  l a s t :  "any sys tem  embodying the  b a l a n c e  o f  power has  
some i n t r i n s i c  t e n d en c y  t o  d i m i n i s h  the  number of  i t s  c o n s t i t u e n t  
p o w e rs  o r  b l o c s ,  and  no i n t r i n s i c  ten d en cy  to  i n c r e a s e  t h a t
T O
number" .  T h i s  " s i m p l e  b a lan c e "  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  u n s t a b l e  and
O Q
u l t i m a t e l y  f i n d s  i t s  r e s o l u t i o n  in  war.
The a d v e n t  of  n u c l e a r  weapons  would t h e r e f o r e  a p p e a r  t o  have 
s e r i o u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  r o l e  o f  war a s  a p r e s s u r e  v a lv e  f o r  
th e  " s i m p le  b a l a n c e " .  B u l l  d i s a g r e e s ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  s i n c e  
the  G r e a t  Powers  have a monopoly on the  use  of n u c l e a r  weapons,  
and have r e f r a i n e d  from u s in g  them a g a i n s t  one a n o t h e r  under  the  
s t r a t e g i c  p o s t u r e  o f  m u tu a l  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e ,  the  b a l a n c e  o f  
power  now o p e r a t e s  on two l e v e l s .  At th e  n u c l e a r  l e v e l ,  the  
s i m p l e  b a l a n c e  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  " f ro z e n "  because  of  th e  r e s t r a i n t  
e x e r c i s e d  by th e  n u c l e a r  powers .  T h i s  r e s t r a i n t  l e a v e s  the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  m echanism s  o f  war and the  b a la n c e  o f  power f r e e  to  
work in  the  n o n - n u c l e a r  a r e n a . ^
B u l l  i n i t i a l l y  d e f i n e d  the  pu rpose  of any o r d e r  a s  p ro m o t in g  
th e  f u n d a m e n ta l  g o a l s  o f  human l i f e  -  l i f e ,  t r u t h  and p r o p e r t y .
His  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  g o a l s  i n t o  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s  p r i n c i p l e s  d id  
n o t  acknow ledge  th e  r i g h t  o f  G r e a t  Powers to  o v e r r i d e  them. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  B u l l  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  
d o m in a t e d  by th e  G r e a t  Powers  s t i l l  p ro m o te s  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l  g o a l s  
o f  human l i f e ,  by m i n i m i s i n g  the  o u tb r e a k  of c o n f l i c t  w i t h  th e  
g o a l  o f  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  s o c i e t y  of  s t a t e s .
Because  s t a t e s  a r e  g r o s s l y  unequa l  in power ,  c e r t a i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i s s u e s  a r e  a s  a consequence  s e t t l e d ,  the  
demands of  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  (weak ones)  can in  p r a c t i c e  be 
l e f t  o u t  o f  a c c o u n t ,  th e  demands of  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  s t a t e s
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( s t r o n g  ones)  r e c o g n i s e d  to  be the  on ly  ones  r e l e v a n t  t o  the  
i s s u e  a t  hand.
G r e a t  Pow ers  c o n t r i b u t e  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  "by managing 
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  one a n o t h e r " ,  and "by e x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  
p r e p o n d e ran c e  in  such  a way a s  t o  i m p a r t  a c e n t r a l  d i r e c t i o n  to  
th e  a f f a i r s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  a s  a w h o l e " . ^  While  the  
G r e a t  Powers  o f t e n  v i o l a t e  o t h e r  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s ,  and may 
" f r e q u e n t l y  behave  in  such  a way a s  t o  promote  d i s o r d e r  r a t h e r  
th an  o r d e r " ,  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  t h e  n u c l e a r  age.  ^
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  th u s  depends  upon the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
the  g r e a t  pow ers  in  e f f e c t i v e l y  "managing t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  one 
a n o t h e r ;  and e x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  p re p o n d e ran c e  in such  a way a s  to  
i m p a r t  a d e g re e  o f  c e n t r a l  d i r e c t i o n  t o  th e  a f f a i r s  of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  a s  a w h o l e " . ^  Bu l l  s a y s  th ey  do t h i s  in a 
number of ways.  They manage t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  e ac h  o t h e r  by 
p r e s e r v i n g  the  g e n e r a l  b a l a n c e  o f  power,  s ee k in g  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e i r  
c r i s e s  w i t h  one a n o t h e r ,  and s ee k in g  to  l i m i t  o r  c o n t a i n  wars  
between them. And th e y  e x p l o i t  t h e i r  p re p o n d e ran c e  in  r e l a t i o n  
to  the  r e s t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  by e x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  l o c a l  
p r e p o n d e ra n c e ,  r e s p e c t i n g  each  o t h e r ' s  s p h e r e s  o f  i n f l u e n c e ,  and 
o c c a s i o n a l l y  t a k i n g  j o i n t  a c t i o n ,  in  a G r e a t  Power c o n c e r t . ^
B u l l  c o n c lu d e s  t h a t  the  S o v i e t  Union and th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  do 
" c a r r y  ou t"  t h e s e  s i x  r o l e s ,  and " t h e r e b y  he lp  t o  s u s t a i n  an o r d e r  
o f  s o r t s ' 1. ^
The c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  B u l l ' s  t h e o r y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  r e s t s  
upon the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  th e  G r e a t  Powers  in e x e r c i s i n g  the  
" r e s t r a i n t "  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  r o l e s  in 
m a i n t a i n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rd e r .
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B u l l  o f f e r s  no e v i d e n c e  t o  prove  h i s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  the  r o l e  
o f  war i s  more c i r c u m s c r i b e d  in th e  n u c l e a r  age.  But i f  t h e r e  i s  
any s u b s t a n c e  t o  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n ,  i t  would be because  B u l l  employs  
a v e r y  n a r ro w  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  war: " o r g a n i s e d  v i o l e n c e  c a r r i e d  on
A H
by p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s  a g a i n s t  each  o t h e r " .  A par t  from one
r e f e r e n c e  t o  " c i v i l  w a r s  (which) a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e d  by v i r t u e
4of the  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  o u t s i d e  s t a t e s  in them)" B u l l  does  no t  
a d d r e s s  t h e  more p e r t i n e n t  i s s u e  o f  g l o b a l  c o n f l i c t .
I f  th e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  c o n v e n t i o n a l  war be tw een  s t a t e s  has  
d e c l i n e d ,  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  of  u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  war has  n o t .  The 
p r e t e x t  t h a t  u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  v i o l e n c e  does  no t  in v o lv e  s t a t e s ,  i s  
n o t  v a l i d  in  an e r a  when a c t s  o f  t e r r o r i s m  and i n t e r v e n t i o n  in the 
c i v i l  w a rs  o f  o t h e r  s t a t e s  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d  
a c t i v i t e s .
W r i t i n g  f i v e  y e a r s  b e f o r e  B u l l ,  George Modelsk i  n o te d  t h a t
the  a b se n c e  o f  d e c l a r e d  w a rs  be tw een  " p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s "  in the
p o s t - w a r  e r a ,  d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply  th e  ab se n c e  o f  g l o b a l
c o n f l i c t . ^  In the  t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r s  be tw een  1945 and 1970 some
s i x t y - f i v e  "armed c o n f l i c t s "  o c c u r r e d  th r o u g h o u t  the  w or ld ,  most
50of  which  were  n e v e r  ' d e c l a r e d '  w ars .  In  s e v e n t y - f i v e  p e r  c e n t
of t h e s e  c a s e s ,  th e  "armed c o n f l i c t s "  i n v o lv e d  o u t s i d e
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  l e a d i n g  Modelsk i  t o  c o n c l u d e ,  "even though th e  g r e a t
powers  d i d  n o t  t h e m s e l v e s  c o l l i d e  in  g l o b a l  com bat ,  t h e y  d i d  c l a s h
i n d i r e c t l y  in  c o n f l i c t s  th e y  were in v o lv e d  in ,  som et im es  th ro u g h  
5 1t h i r d  p a r t i e s " .
B u l l ' s  c l a i m  t h a t  " s t a b i l i t y "  i s  i m p a r t e d  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r d e r  by t h e  " m a n a g e r i a l "  r o l e  of  th e  G r e a t  Powers  r e s t s  on a
22
deliberately narrow definition of war as, "organised violence 
carried out by political units against each other". Thus Bull is 
able to ignore the indirect means by which Great Powers are able 
to play out their competitiveness, without engaging in 
conventional war.
Wight identified three main ways in which states could play 
out their conflict when war was not available as an instrument of 
policy: first, compensation - "giving a state the equivalent of 
something of which you deprive it"; second, intervention - usually 
into the affairs of a satellite state; and third, the
nestablishment of buffer states. In the nuclear age,
identification of such activities provides a useful guide to what 
measures are available to Great Powers who are prevented from 
using declared war as an instrument of policy. If the posture of 
mutual nuclear deterrence has reduced the onset of declared war, 
in terms of Wight's analysis MND is likely to be contributing to 
the escalation of non-declared conflict. The function of MND in 
"freezing" the simple balance forces the great powers to play out 
their rivalry by Wight's three alternate strategies, all of which 
involve interference in the affairs of other states.
Bull thus fails to support his argument that the rights of 
states, and the special rights of Great Powers should be prior to 
the rights of individuals for the sake of international order.
He shows no evidence to support the contention that the 
international society conception of order promotes justice for 
individuals within states, nor that states, particularly Great 
Powers, exercise restraint in the interests of maintaining order 
among states in the nuclear age.
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The balance of power may well have been an instrument of 
stability in world politics in centuries past, but traditional 
balance of power theory never attributed states' motives to
Canything but the pursuit of self-interest. Bull attempts to 
reinterpret balance of power theory in light of the nuclear age, 
by asserting that states, particularly the Great Powers, exercise 
self-restraint in the conduct of international relations. The 
proof of such self-restraint, in terms of a reduced incidence of 
declared war between states, rests on a deliberately narrow 
definition of war which excludes the range of alternative methods 
available to states when declared war is not a viable instrument 
of policy. With the Great Powers locked in a simple balance, it 
appears more likely that MND would result in an escalation of 
unconventional conflict, as states play out their competitiveness 
by other means.
Bull is so concerned to defend the role of the Great Powers 
in international politics, driven perhaps, by what Fitzpatrick 
calls, "conservative idealism"-* , that his portrayal of the state 
verges on anthropomorphic. He sees the state not merely in 
holistic terms, but within the "international society" conception, 
attributes to the Great Powers rights and responsibilities which 
one would expect of an individual in a social order. Yet he 
never offers any explanation as to why we would suddenly expect 
states to set aside their own interests for the long-term goal of 
preserving international society.
Bull's "international society" conception of world order 
suffers the contradictions inherent in attempting to develop a 
theory of order on the basis of a state's right to pursue its own 
interests. The claim that allowing states to pursue their own
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interests will result in order, does not explain how such order 
will come about. As such, Bull fails to explain how the 
"international society" conception departs from the Hobbesian 
interpretation which argues that the pursuit of self-interest 
renders international society a state of anarchy. Bull's attempt 
to bridge this gap by vesting moral responsibility in the state is 
invalid in the absence of evidence to demonstrate the state's 
capacity to exercise self-restraint with the goal of preserving 
international society.
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CHAPTER THREE
A PRACTICAL CONCEPTION OF WORLD ORDER
In the preface to Law, Morality and the Relations of States/ 
Terry Nardin describes his work as neither "empirical" nor 
"normative" but rather "philosophical" in approach, "in the sense 
of an examination of the assumptions underlying particular ways of 
speaking and thinking".^ He claims he is not interested in 
justifying or recommending conduct, but rather in explaining how 
the set of authoritative practices which govern the behaviour of 
states embody an international morality. Nardin is, however, 
defending a conception of order which upholds the rights of states 
to pursue their own interests.
While Bull portrays states as having a shared purpose in the 
preservation of the international system, Nardin argues that 
states have no shared purpose other than the pursuit of self- 
interest. However, international order is a bi-product of 
states' mutual recognition of the state's right to single-mindedly 
pursue its own goals within a framework of constraints which 
recognise the right of all states to do the same. International 
law thus provides the framework to facilitate the pursuit of 
states' interests and, Nardin argues, to accommodate recognition 
of individual rights.
Nardin strongly refutes the idea that states co-operate in 
the pursuit of a common purpose, such as the preservation of 
international society. He argues instead that the best way to 
achieve order in international relations is to allow states to 
pursue divergent ends, and to incorporate this principle into
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. The e x t e n t  to  which mora l  a im s  can be 
a c h i e v e d  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s  n o t  t h e r e f o r e  d e p en d e n t  
upon s t a t e s  com bin ing  t o  p u r s u e  a common p u rp o s e ,  b u t  on the  
d eg ree  t o  which  th e y  a r e  a b l e  t o  p u r s u e  t h e i r  own g o a l s  w i t h i n  the  
l i m i t s  imposed  by a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s .  These a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
p r a c t i c e s  d e r i v e  from th e  a c t u a l  b e h a v i o u r  o f  s t a t e s  and a r e  
d e f i n e d  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.
A ccord ing  t o  N a r d i n ' s  " p r a c t i c a l "  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  th e  common good i s  r e a l i s e d  b o th  by 
m ax im is ing  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  p e a c e f u l  c o e x i s t e n c e  among s t a t e s  
( i e .  p r e s e r v i n g  o r d e r  among s t a t e s  p ro m o te s  j u s t i c e  w i t h i n  them) 
and by th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  human r i g h t s  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. The 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in  N a r d i n ' s  t h e o r y  i s  h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law can r e s p e c t  the  r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h i l e  a t  
the  same t im e  r e s p e c t i n g  th e  r i g h t s  of  s t a t e s .
2.1 A " M o r a l i t y  o f  Mutual  Accommodation"
N ard in  a r g u e s  t h a t  th e  sys tem  of  s t a t e s  i s  form of  
a s s o c i a t i o n  where in  s p i t e  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  no common power t o  
e n f o r c e  la w s  g o v e r n in g  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw ee n  members of the  communi ty ,  
c e r t a i n  r e s t r a i n t s  on b e h a v i o u r  a r e  u p h e ld  becau se  s t a t e s  
v o l u n t a r i l y  comply  w i t h  them. These r e s t r a i n t s  amount t o  a s e t  
of  " a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s "  w i t h i n  which s t a t e s  a r e  o b l i g e d  to  
c o n d u c t  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  one a n o t h e r .  A u t h o r i t a t i v e  
p r a c t i c e s  c o n s i s t  of " r u l e s ,  p r i n c i p l e s ,  c e r e m o n i e s ,  m anners ,  and 
p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  a l l  who f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a r e  
supposed  to  o b s e r v e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w h e th e r  such  o b se r v a n c e  i s  
f a v o r a b l e  o r  u n f a v o r a b l e  t o  the  p u r s u i t  of p a r t i c u l a r  ends" .
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Authoritative practices are embodied in the many types of 
practical associations formed to regulate interactions between 
states, such as diplomacy, customary international law, and 
"certain moral traditions". Authoritative practices are not 
laid down by a law-making authority, but evolve over time as 
states pursue their own interests in the international arena. To 
be able to pursue their own interests, states must adhere to 
certain conventions which, Nardin says, recognise the right of 
other states to do the same. Nardin sees these authoritative 
practices as embodying a principle of "mutual accomodation" which 
forms the essence of the morality of states.
Authoritative practices are obviously not binding on states 
all of the time, otherwise international conflict would not occur. 
Nevertheless, Nardin sees authoritative practices, based on the 
principle of mutual accommodation, as providing a set of values 
"by which international conduct is to be guided and judged".4 
He argues international law should reflect only the principle of 
mutual accommodation which recognises the rights of all states to 
pursue their own ends, bound only by the constaints that allow 
other states to do the same.
Nardin objects to those international theorists and lawyers 
who attempt to portray states as capable of pursuing common goals 
rather than simply their own ends.-’ He calls such a conception 
of international society "purposive" in contrast with his 
"practical" conception based on the practices of states. Nardin 
does not deny that states often co-operate to promote shared 
purposes, but says they are only able to do so because 
authoritative practices already exist. The institutions and 
authoritative practices of international society are merely
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mechanisms which provide the optimum environment for states to 
achieve their own goals. Any higher purpose can only be achieved 
"within an existing framework of practices and procedures, at 
least some of which have not been deliberately instituted".
The "practical" conception (ie. one which recognises the 
rights of states to pursue their own goals) is therefore "a 
condition for the public order of the community", whereas a 
purposive conception of international society presupposes the 
seeking of other ends, (ie. common goals) which may undermine the
nexisting basis of order. While the practical conception is 
supposedly the outcome of state practice, Nardin, like Bull, sees 
a need to defend his conception of world order against perceived 
"threats" from those who advocate principles of state behaviour 
other than the pursuit of self-interest.
He roundly criticises what he perceives to be a twentieth 
century trend to make "the purposive conception of international
osociety... (the) leading doctrine of world order". He cites 
moves within the United Nations "to promote the realisation of the 
social and economic welfare of its constituent societies", as an 
inappropriate attempt by states to do something "not merely as a 
means to international peace and security but as an end in
Qitself". Such activities do not result in a "new purposive 
consensus", but rather "an incoherence that has further weakened 
the hold of the practical conception on the conduct of states - 
the majority of which are new states for whom the experience of 
participation in the United Nations has a significance that it 
does not have for the older states of European origin".^
Nardin thinks purposive conceptions of international society
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" m is ta k e  the  b a s i s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  the  c h a r a c t e r  of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law ,  and th e  meaning of  moral conduct  in  w or ld
a f f a i r s " . ^  He s a y s  th e  p u r p o s i v e  a p p ro a ch  does  n o t  u n d e r s t a n d
t h a t  the  o n ly  means of  a c h i e v i n g  w o r ld  o r d e r  i s  t o  r e c o g n i s e  the
r i g h t s  o f  s t a t e s  t o  p u r s u e  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  "Often t h e r e  i s
no s h a r e d  p u rp o se  u n i t i n g  t h o s e  whose conduct  i s  governed  by an
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e  such  a s  a m o r a l i t y  or a sys tem  o f  l a w s ,  and
in  such  c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  no b a s i s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o t h e r  than  t h e s e
1 0common c o n s t r a i n t s " .
As I p o i n t e d  o u t  in c h a p t e r  one ,  the  ag reem en t  among s t a t e s  
t o  p u r s u e  common i n t e r e s t s  do es  n o t  im p ly  t h a t  e v e r y  s t a t e  i s  n o t  
p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  p u r s u i n g  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s .  However, 
l i k e  B u l l ,  Nard in  i s  a t t e m p t i n g  to  a d v o c a t e  a c o n c e p t io n  of o r d e r  
which he f e e l s  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  may n o t  a c c e p t ,  in the  m is t a k e n  
b e l i e f  t h a t  T h i r d  World s t a t e s  seek  t o  u n d e r l i n e  the  b a s i s  of the  
p r e s e n t  w o r ld  o r d e r .  S t a t e s '  p u r s u i t  of s c - c a l l e d  p u r p o s iv e  
g o a l s  t h r o u g h  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  l i k e  th e  U ni ted  
N a t io n s ,  t a k e s  p l a c e  w i t h i n  a s e t  of  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  which 
c o n t i n u e  to  r e c o g n i s e  th e  r i g h t s  o f  s t a t e s  as a f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e .  
The e x i s t e n c e  of " p u r p o s iv e "  a c t i v i t i e s  does  no t  mean the  sy s te m  
of  s t a t e s  i s  becoming " a c o - o p e r a t i v e  v e n tu r e  where p e o p le  work 
t o g e t h e r  f o r  m utua l  a d v a n t a g e " ,  b e ca u se  the U n i t e d  N a t io n s  i s  a 
forum w i t h i n  which  s o v e r e i g n  s t a t e s  a r e  th e  only  l e g i t i m a t e  v o i c e .  
The p u r s u i t  o f  common g o a l s  by s t a t e s  does  not n e c e s s a r i l y  
i n d i c a t e  any weakening  of  s t a t e s '  i n t e n t i o n s  to  pu rsu e  t h e i r  own 
g o a l s ,  b u t  c o u ld  r e p r e s e n t  th e  p u r s u i t  of those  g o a l s  by d i f f e r e n t  
means. P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in " p u r p o s iv e "  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  any k ind  
r e m a in s  v o l u n t a r y ,  and  s t a t e s  r e m a in  a t  l i b e r t y  to  pu rsu e  t h e i r  
g o a l s  however th e y  choose .
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N e v e r t h e l e s s  N a rd in  a r g u e s  t h a t  p u rp o s iv e  c o n c e r n s  must no t  
be r e c o g n i s e d  in  any form in th e  d o c t r i n e s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law ,  
even i f  t h e y  a r e  s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d  a c t i v i t i e s .
2.2 The Role  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law
N ard in  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t o  be e f f e c t i v e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law 
s h o u ld  o n ly  embody th e  r u l e s  and s t a n d a r d s  of the  p r a c t i c a l  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  in t h a t  " the  a u t h o r i t y  of 
t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o r  r u l e s  g o v e rn in g  r e l a t i o n s  among th e  a s s o c i a t e s  i s  
in d e p e n d e n t  of the  p a r t i c u l a r  ends  sough t  by e a c h " . ^  Thus th e  
so u rce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law sh o u ld  be the  p r a c t i c e s  of  s t a t e s .
While N ard in  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  gu idance  a s  to  what t h e s e  
p r i n c i p l e s  m igh t  be s h o u ld  come from cu s to m ary  p r a c t i c e s  of 
s t a t e s ,  he a l s o  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law s h o u ld  embody the  
p r i n c i p l e  of  m utua l  a cco m m o d a t io n ,  and a v o id  e n d o r s i n g  p u r p o s iv e  
a p p r o a c h e s  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y .  Nardin  s e e s  the  p r i n c i p l e  
of  mutua l  accom m oda t ion  a s  the  mora l  f o u n d a t io n  o f  o r d e r  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  The " m o r a l i t y  of accommodation" 
r e c o g n i s e s  e v e r y  s t a t e ' s  r i g h t  to  l e g i t i m a t e l y  p u r s u e  i t s  own ends  
in th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r e n a ,  and i s  th u s  the  on ly  m o r a l i t y  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  a s o c i e t y  of  s t a t e s .  The m o r a l i t y  of 
accom m odat ion  i s  "an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e  composed of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o  be t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  in ju d g in g  and a c t i n g .
Such a m o r a l i t y  does  n o t  i t s e l f  s p e c i f y  the  p a r t i c u l a r  ends  t o  be 
so u g h t  in  a c t i o n ;  on th e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  p r e s u p p o s e s  and see k s  to  
r e g u l a t e  th e  c o n d u c t  of p e r s o n s  engaged in p u r s u in g  t h e i r  own 
s e l f - c h o s e n  e n d s " . ^
Nard in  j u s t i f i e s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of "mutual accommodation"  a s
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the only appropriate moral principle of international law, because 
it is the only means of promoting peaceful co-existence among 
states. "The common good of this inclusive community resides not 
in the ends that some, or at times most, of its members may wish 
collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, 
security and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through 
participation in a common body of authoritative practices".^
Nardin's basic assumption is that all states pursue
divergent and conflicting goals in international society,
therefore, it is only by recognising and accommodating these
differences that international order is possible. Those who
advocate a purposive international society "fail to offer any
account of how the unity they postulate is to be reconciled with
the actual diversity of ends that characterises our world". He
argues it is only by acknowledging and protecting this diversity
that order will be achieved. When certain states or individuals
attempt to foist their ends upon international society by trying
to enlist the co-operation of other states in pursuit of a common
purpose, they "neglect to consider the implications, for their own
proposals, of the fact that international society is distinguished
from a state of extreme conflict not so much by the degree to
which its members are moved to co-operate in the pursuit of common
interests as by the degree to which they understand themselves to
be members of a society bound by common rules, moved sometimes by
1 ftcommon and sometimes by divergent interests".
International law, thus interpreted, is an important 
mechanism for upholding the practical conception of international 
society. The primary source of international law is the actual 
behaviour of states in international society - the extent to
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w hich ,  in  p u r s u i n g  t h e i r  own g o a l s ,  s t a t e s  adhere  to  c e r t a i n  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e i r  b e h a v io u r .  Such c o n s t r a i n t s ,  which embody 
the  p r i n c i p l e  of m utua l  accom m odat ion ,  form the b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  
" p r a c t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n " ,  and t h e r e b y  p r o v i d e  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l  
p r i n c i p l e s  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. The r o l e  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law 
i s  t o  uph o ld  and s t r e n g t h e n  the  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t io n ,  by e n d o r s i n g  
p r i n c i p l e s  which  r e c o g n i s e  the  r i g h t s  o f  a l l  s t a t e s  t o  p u rsu e  
t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  t h u s  c o n s t i t u t e d  "by 
the  fo rm s  and  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  s t a t e s  a r e  o b l i g a t e d  to  o b s e r v e  in  
t h e i r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w i t h  one a n o t h e r " . ^
A l though  Nard in  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  the  sou rce  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
law i s  s t a t e  p r a c t i c e  and the  m o r a l i t y  of mutual accommodat ion  i s  
em bodied  in  s t a t e  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  does  n o t  r e s o l v e  
t h e  p rob lem  of  n o n -c o m p l ia n c e  by s t a t e s .  I f  s t a t e s  c o n t i n u a l l y  
b reak  the  r u l e s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r ,  a t  what p o i n t  do the  
r u l e s  c e a s e  t o  be i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w ,  g iv e n  t h a t  the  so u rce  of a l l  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  supposed  to  be s t a t e  p r a c t i c e ?  Nard in  
a r g u e s  t h a t  the  ju d g em en ts  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w y e r s  a l s o  p r o v id e  a 
s o u rc e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. "The r e a s o n i n g s  f a v o re d  by t h i s  
community  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  c u s t o d i a n s  d e t e r m i n e  the  c h a r a c t e r  and 
d e v e lo p m e n t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. . ."  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w y e r s  s h o u ld  a lw a y s  r e f l e c t  the  p r a c t i c a l  
c o n c e p t i o n ,  i e .  the  p r i n c i p l e  of m u tu a l  accommodation.
A l though  c u s to m a ry  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  a d i s t i l l a t i o n  of 
s t a t e  p r a c t i c e ,  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of what c o n s t i t u t e s  s t a t e  
p r a c t i c e  b e lo n g s  t o  a community  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t e r s  
whose ju d g e m e n t s ,  i f  u n o f f i c i a l ,  a r e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  e x t r e m e l y ,  
i n f l u e n t i a l .
The s o u r c e s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law a r e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  c l o s e l y  
l i n k e d  to  th e  p o t e n t i a l  s o u r c e s  of law e n f o r c e m e n t  in t h a t  the
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l e g i t i m a c y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law u l t i m a t e l y  r e s t s  upon s t a t e  
p r a c t i c e  -  c u s to m ary  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. I f  the  m a j o r i t y  o f  
s t a t e s  choose  to  d i s r e g a r d  an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  i t  i s  
n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.  Nardin  l i k e n s  th e  power 
of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law t o  a " n a t u r a l  language . . .  b a se d  u l t i m a t e l y  on 
th e  p r a c t i c e  of  i t s  u s e r s .  Like t h e  r u l e s  of l a n g u a g e ,  th o s e  o f  
c u s to m ary  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law a r e  n o t  the  outcome of p a r t i c u l a r  
d e c i s i o n s  t o  c r e a t e  them,  b u t  r a t h e r  the  i n d i r e c t  consequence  of 
in n u m e ra b le  and s u b s t a n t i v e l y  m o t i v a t e d  a c t s ,  d e c i s i o n s  and 
p o l i c i e s " . ^
The u l t i m a t e  power of  e n f o r c e m e n t  i s  the i m p e r a t i v e  t h a t  
s t a t e s  o f t e n  need t o  use  c o n v e n t i o n a l  means of com m unica t ion  to  
pu rsu e  t h e i r  g o a l s .  The power of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law r e s t s  on the  
a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  no s t a t e  can be exempt  from the r u l e  of law i f  i t  
w i s h es  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y .  Nard in  p o i n t s  ou t  
t h a t  in the  modern s t a t e s  s y s te m ,  no s t a t e  can be a s u c c e s s f u l  
a u t a r c h y ,  and a l l  s t a t e s  a p p e a r  t o  d e s i r e  economic  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  o t h e r  s t a t e s .  So t o  some e x t e n t ,  s t a t e s  a r e  i n v a r i a b l y  bound 
by the  r u l e s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  law t h u s  r e q u i r e s  no common a u t h o r i t y  t o  make 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ,  b e ca u se  i t  i s  a p p l i e d  "by a v a r i e t y  of o f f i c i a l s  
in a v a r i e t y  of fo rum s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th o s e  of s t a t e s " . ^  Nor does  i t  
r e q u i r e  a common ju d g e ,  b e c a u s e  i t s  v a l i d i t y  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
g e n e r a l  c o nsensus .
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  l a w - a p p l y i n g  o f f i c i a l s ,  w h e th e r  
j u d i c i a l  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ,  n a t i o n a l  or  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  
a r e . . .  u l t i m a t e l y  v a l i d a t e d . . .  t h ro u g h  the c o l l e c t i v e  
judgement  of  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community a s  i t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  
in the  c u m u l a t i v e  r e s u l t  of v a r i o u s  n o n -b in d i n g  r e v i e w s  by 
s t a t e s m e n ,  ju d g e s  and l e g a l  co m m en ta to r s .  I f  an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law made in  th e  h a n d l i n g  of 
a p a r t i c u l a r  d i s p u t e  r e c e i v e s  g e n e r a l  s u p p o r t ,  i t s  v a l i d i t y
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a s  a p a r t  of g e n e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  t h e r e b y  
c o n f i rm e d . 25
Yet a s  the  o n ly  measure  of e n f o r c e m e n t  i s  s t a t e s '  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s y s te m ,  the  
s t r e n g t h  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law depends  on th e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
s t a t e s  need  to  c o - o p e r a t e  t o  p u rsu e  t h e i r  g o a l s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w y e r s  can a t t e m p t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  th e  b a s i s  of 
e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  b u t  u l t i m a t e l y ,  by N a r d i n ' s  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  the  v a l i d i t y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law depends  upon s t a t e  
p r a c t i c e .  The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law a s  a t o o l  of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  t h u s  depends  on w h e th e r  or  n o t  s t a t e s  choose  
to  a b id e  by a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  to  a c h i e v e  t h e i r  ends .  I f  
s t a t e s  choose to  p u r s u e  t h e i r  ends  by n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e  means,  fo r  
exam ple ,  th ey  a r e  a t  l i b e r t y  to  do so.
By com par ing  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  w i th  a " n a t u r a l  
l a n g u a g e " ,  Nard in  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a l l  s t a t e s  a r e  bound to  adhere  to  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  i f  t h e y  w ish  to  pu rsue  t h e i r  g o a l s .  In 
e v e r y d a y  m a t t e r s ,  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s ,  such a s  the  r u l e s  
g o v e rn in g  t r a n s p o r t  and co m m unica t ion  be tw een  s t a t e s ,  f a c i l i t a t e  
the  s t a t e ' s  p u r s u i t  of i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  In c i r c u m s t a n c e s  where 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  have an im m ed ia te  u t i l i t y ,  in  th e  r u l e s  of 
d ip lo m a c y ,  c o m m u n ic a t i o n s  and so on,  s t a t e s  use th e  p r a c t i c e s  t o  
a c h i e v e  ends  which  would be more d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c h i e v e  by o t h e r  
means.  There  i s  l i t t l e  e v i d e n c e ,  however,  of s t a t e s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  
t o  a c c e p t  r e s t r a i n t s  on t h e i r  a c t i o n s  which would impede the  
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  g o a l s  even when such  r e s t r a i n t s  embody the  
" m o r a l i t y  of m utua l  accommodat ion"  which  r e c o g n i s e s  o t h e r  s t a t e s '  
r i g h t s .  Given t h a t  N ard in  r e c o g n i s e s  s t a t e s '  f u n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t  
to  pu rsu e  t h e i r  own g o a l s ,  no s t a t e  i s  bound by a u t h o r i t a t i v e
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c o n s t r a i n t s  u n l e s s  i t  v o l u n t e e r s  t o  do so.
The p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  t h e r e f o r e  
does  n o t  d e p i c t  a v o l u n t a r y  " m o r a l i t y "  o f  s t a t e  p r a c t i c e ,  in  t h a t  
s t a t e s  can o n l y  be e x p e c t e d  t o  a d h e r e  to  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  
when i t  s u i t s  t h e i r  own p u r p o s e s .  The p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n  
r e c o g n i s e s  t h a t  i f  a s t a t e  can  a c h i e v e  i t s  g o a l s  by means which 
o v e r r i d e  o t h e r  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s  t o  m utua l  accom m oda t ion ,  i t  i s  a t  
l i b e r t y  t o  do so ,  f r e e  o f  any c o n s t r a i n t s  from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.
R e c o g n i t i o n  o f  s t a t e ' s  r i g h t s  w i t h i n  N a r d i n ' s  p r a c t i c a l  
c o n c e p t i o n  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r ,  and th e  embodim ent of  s t a t e s '  
r i g h t s  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law ,  would  t h u s  seem t o  p r o v i d e  m in im a l  
p r o t e c t i o n  of  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s .  I f  s t a t e s  choose  n o t  t o  be 
m o ra l ,  i e .  t o  a c t  o u t s i d e  th e  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  b a se d  on a 
the  m o r a l i t y  o f  m u tu a l  a cco m m o d a t io n ,  n e i t h e r  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s ,  nor 
i n d i v i d u a l s '  r i g h t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be r e s p e c t e d .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  
Nardin  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law a l s o  has th e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
r e c o g n i s e  and accommodate  p r i n c i p l e s  which r e s p e c t  human r i g h t s .
2.3 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law and Human R i g h t s
As i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law o n l y  r e s p e c t s  the  r i g h t s  o f  s t a t e s ,  
d i s t i l l e d  "from th e  common p r a c t i c e s  of th e  s o c i e t y  of s t a t e s ,  
e x p r e s s i n g  more p r e c i s e l y  and e x p l i c i t l y  th e  t e r m s  of a s s o c i a t i o n  
embodied in them",  th e  r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  would a p p e a r  to  be 
r e s p e c t e d  o n ly  a s  a b i - p r o d u c t  of  o r d e r l y  r e l a t i o n s  among s t a t e s .
However N a rd in  a r g u e s  t h a t  human r i g h t s  p r i n c i p l e s  can be 
g iven  e f f e c t  in th e  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.
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The moral element in international law is to be found in 
those general principles of international association that 
constitute customary international law... such as the ones 
specifying the rights of independence, legal equality, and 
self-defence, and the duties to observe treaties, to respect 
the immunity of ambassadors, to refrain from aggression, to 
conduct hostilities in war in accordance with the laws of 
war, to respect human rights, and to co-operate in the 
peaceful settlement of disputes..
Nardin also argues that international law "applies" to 
individuals as well as to states. "Although it is true that for 
the most part international law applies to the conduct of states, 
it does in some circumstances apply to the conduct of individuals. 
It includes, on the one hand, principles of responsibility that 
bring the conduct of individuals directly under international 
law..." He cites examples from the past as piracy and crimes of 
war, and claims that more recently international law, "has been 
moving in the direction of setting minimum standards for the 
treatment of individuals by states, and thus toward the direct
-3 nrecognition and protection of individual or...'human' rights".
The above statements would seem at variance with Nardin's 
thesis that the source and validity of international law should be 
the practice of states, that interpretations of international law 
should only reflect the practical conception of international 
society, and that enforcement of legal principles should be 
voluntary on the part of states. However Nardin argues the rights 
of individuals are respected within the international legal system 
in four different ways.
First, Nardin argues, the rights of individuals are 
respected indirectly by recognising the rights of states. "The 
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention reflect the 
consideration that, in a world organised as a society of states,
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i n d i v i d u a l s  have r i g h t s  l a r g e l y  a s  members of a p o l i t i c a l  
community  -  t h a t  i s ,  a s  c i t i z e n s  o f  a s t a t e s " . ^
Second,  r e s p e c t  f o r  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s  i m p l i e s  r e s p e c t  f o r  human 
r i g h t s .  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  " m o r a l i t y  of accommodat ion"  r e f l e c t s  
v a l u e s  of  p l u r a l i s m  w hich  can be e q u a t e d  w i th  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y .  
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l  law t h e r e f o r e  e x p r e s s e s  a co n ce rn  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
l i b e r t y  n o t  o n ly  i n s o f a r  a s  the  s t a t e s  whose i n t e g r i t y  i s  
p r e s e r v e d  by a d h e r e n c e  t o  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  a r e  
th o s e  in  which  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  can f l o u r i s h  b u t  b e ca u se  i t  
r e i n f o r c e s  g l o b a l  p l u r a l i s m " .
T h i r d ,  N a rd in  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law r e c o g n i s e s  the  
r i g h t s  of  i n d i v i d u a l s  by " p l a c i n g  l i m i t s  on s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  and 
by p e r m i t t i n g  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in which t h i s  
l i b e r t y  i s  g r a v e l y  t h r e a t e n e d " ,  c i t i n g  g en o c id e  a s  one type  of 
s i t u a t i o n  which  " h a s  long  been r e c o g n i s e d  a s  j u s t i f y i n g  f o r e i g n  
co n ce rn  and a c t i o n " . ^
F o u r th ,  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s t a t e s '  r i g h t s  
and human r i g h t s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  N a rd in  s e e s  "no 
r e a s o n  why th e  re g im e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r u l e s  c o n f e r r i n g  r i g h t s  on 
i n d i v i d u a l s  m ig h t  n o t  be g r e a t l y  augmented  w i t h i n  th e  framework  of 
the  s o c i e t y  o f  s t a t e s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law as  we know i t " . ^  He 
e n v i s a g e s  t h i s  a s  a p ro b le m  of d e f i n i t i o n ,  whereby i f  l e s s  w e ig h t  
were g iv en  t o  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  and  more w e ig h t  to  
th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s ,  the  r e s u l t a n t  r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n  
would a f f o r d  more r i g h t s  to  the  i n d i v i d u a l  a t  the  e x p en se  of 
" f u r t h e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s o v e r e i g n  pow ers  o f  
s t a t e s " . ^
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Only the first of these points - that individuals possess 
rights as members of states - is consistent with Nardin's 
conception of customary international law. The remaining three 
contradict Nardin's thesis that the source of all law is the 
practice of states.
Nardin clearly identified the source and validity of 
international law as the customary practices of states. Even if 
respect for human rights could be written into international law 
by reducing the rights of states, as Nardin suggests, he fails to 
show how such a re-definition could take effect, given that 
international law embodies state practice. Should international 
lawyers take on the task of re-defining states rights vis a vis 
human rights, by Nardin's own definition, such determinations are 
not valid unless they endorse the principle cf every state's right 
to pursue its own ends, and are ratified by state practice.
While states may be capable of moral action, as Nardin 
suggests, they have not, as yet, shown any indication of accepting 
restraints on their behaviour, either in regard other states or in 
regard to individuals, unless it serves their own interests.
Nardin supplies no evidence to support his ccntention that the 
principle of non-intervention is being modified in favour of 
recognition of human rights. The opposite would seem to be true, 
judging from the statements and behaviour of states, and the 
widespread rhetorical endorsement of the principle of non­
intervention. In practice, while state-spor.sored interventions 
may be justifiable on humanitarian grounds, the states to 
intervene would always attract criticism for having ulterior 
motives, a factor consistent with Nardin's expectation that states 
will only support principles of law which facilitate the pursuit
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of their self-interest.
Thus Nardin's first argument that individual's rights can be 
respected indirectly, by protecting the rights of states, is the 
only valid interpretation of his thesis that individual justice 
will be served by the practical conception of international order. 
Human rights can only be promoted if the values of "peace, 
justice, protected liberty and guaranteed rights' are upheld by 
state practice.
2.4 The Limitations of the Practical Conception
17
Nardin fails to demonstrate why we should expect the state 
to accept restraints which do not serve its own interests. While 
his description of international society as as practical 
association implies a voluntary morality on the part of states 
who are willing to accept constraints on their activities, he 
neglects to examine the circumstances under which states choose to 
comply with authoritative practices. He therefore escapes having 
to distinguish between authoritative practices which are 
utilitarian in nature and assist states achieve their goals, and 
other restraints upon state behaviour which do not serve a state's 
interests. There would appear to be no indication of the latter 
form of voluntary self-restraint influencing state practice, 
regardless of whether the restraints recognise the rights of 
states or the rights of individuals.
The authoritative practices "constraining" state behaviour 
only work if a state is pursuing certain interests, like economic 
or diplomatic goals, which require mutual co-operation for their 
success. If a state considers these interests would be better
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served by other means, like war, for instance, the basis for 
mutual co-operation breaks down, and any bi-products like "peace, 
justice, protected liberty and guaranteed rights" disappear along 
with it.^
Nardin's conception of international relations as a 
practical association attempts to marry a principle which 
recognises a state's right to pursue its own interest, with a 
principle of "mutual accommodation" that says states should 
respect other states' rights to do the same. The only means of 
reconciling these two contradictory principles is to imply that 
states will voluntarily accept restraints on their own actions to 
respect the rights of other states.^0 Nardin assumes the 
existence of such a "morality of mutual accommodation" in state 
practice to underpin his argument that international law ahould 
only reflect state practice.
The potential of international law to defend either the 
morality of mutual accommodation or human rights is limited by the 
fact that international law is not binding upon states. This 
situation is not improved by Nardin's advocacy that international 
law should only embody principles which recognise states' rights. 
The authoritative practices which Nardin depicts as the embodiment 
of an international morality, are merely functional mechanisms to 
facilitate the state's pursuit of self-interest. Whether or not 
the international legal order derives from the practices of 
states, individual rights are only recognised in the context of 
states' rights, and states' rights are subordinated to the 
principle of un-restrained self-interest.
In arguing that recognition of authoritative practices
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s e r v e s  the  goa l  of p e a c e f u l  c o e x i s t e n c e ,  Nardin f a i l s  t o  p o i n t  ou t  
t h a t  c o e x i s t e n c e  i s  n o t  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  war o r  c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  b u t  
m e re ly  a n o t h e r  means by which  s t a t e s  can a ch ie v e  t h e i r  ends .  In 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y ,  b o t h  c o n f l i c t  and c o - o p e r a t i o n  a r e  
a l t e r n a t e  means t o  t h e  same end -  a s t a t e ' s  p u r s u i t  o f  i t s  own 
i n t e r e s t .  A s t a t e  i s  f r e e  t o  choose  which method i t  a d o p t s ,  and 
w h i l e  the  a c t i o n s  o f  w eake r  s t a t e s  may be c o n f in e d  t o  th e  co ­
o p e r a t i v e  mechanisms a v a i l a b l e  t o  them, power w i l l  a l w a y s  be used  
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  the  p u r s u i t  o f  the  g o a l s  of s t a t e s  which  a r e  s t r o n g  
enough to  d e p lo y  i t .
The b a s i c  f l a w  in  N a r d i n ' s  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t io n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  comes from h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  a 
s t a t e ' s  p u r s u i t  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  can s e r v e  a h i g h e r  p r i n c i p l e  of 
j u s t i c e ,  i e .  the  " m o r a l i t y  of  m u tua l  accommodation".  Nardin  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  the  b a s i s  of  a l l  law sh o u ld  be the the  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
p r a c t i c e s  of s t a t e s .  But a l t h o u g h  the  number of a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
p r a c t i c e s  g o v e rn in g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  s t a t e s  i n c r e a s e s  e v e r y  
day , t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  d o e s  n o t  im p ly  a n y t h i n g  more th an  c o o p e r a t i o n  
on a f u n c t i o n a l  l e v e l .
Like  road  r u l e s ,  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  have d e v e lo p e d  from 
a few s im p le  g u i d e l i n e s  t o  a complex web of p r o c e d u r e s ,  b u t  th e y  
were n e v e r  i n t e n d e d  t o  s e r v e  a n y t h i n g  o t h e r  than  a u t i l i t a r i a n  
p u rp o se .  By a d h e r i n g  t o  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s ,  s t a t e s  need no t  
r e c o g n i s e  any p r i n c i p l e  o t h e r  than  th e  go a l  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and 
N ard in  f a i l s  to  d e m o n s t r a t e  how r e c o g n i t i o n  of th e  s t a t e ' s  r i g h t  
to  p u r s u e  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s  am ounts  t o  mora l conduct  in w o r ld  
a f f a i r s .
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CHAPTER THREE
A COSMOPOLITAN CONCEPTION OF WORLD ORDER
In Political Theory and International Relations, Charles 
Beitz aims to demonstrate the flaws in the realist conception of 
international relations as a state of nature, and "to lay the 
groundwork for a more satisfactory normative theory of 
international relations."^- The basis for Beitz's normative 
theory is his observation that international society is now 
sufficiently similar to domestic political society (and dissimilar 
from a state of nature) that principles of distributive justice 
should be incorporated into international theory. However, in 
developing this normative theory, Beitz does not depart 
significantly from the states' rights thesis, merely contending 
that a state's right to autonomy should be linked to the extent to 
which its institutions conform to appropriate principles of 
domestic justice, and that states have the right to receive 
distributive justice from other states.
Beitz's approach differs from Bull's and Nardin's in that it 
does not profess to be an "objective" description of events, but 
the basis of a new normative theory. He approaches this task by 
first "justifying" his principles in philosopical terms, and then 
using their philosophical "rationality", to prove their relevance 
to international practice.
Beitz justifies his conception of world order in two ways: 
by examining the analogy between international relations and the 
Hobbesian state of nature; and by supporting his conclusions with 
observations about the nature of the international environment.
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Finally, he argues for the incorporation of these principles into 
state practice, both as a means by which we can judge a state's 
actions and as a means of changing state behaviour. Later in 
this chapter I will discuss the process by which Beitz believes 
this incorporation can take place.
3.1 The Moral State
In the first part of his book, Beitz seeks to establish that 
the state has the potential to be moral, ie. capable of exercising 
the self-restraint necessary to adhere to a code of conduct based 
on agreed principles.
Beitz begins by offering a critique of "realist scepticism" 
among international relations theorists who, he claims, deny the 
possibility of morality in international relations because of 
international society's resemblance to a Hobbesian state of 
nature. He sees the realist position as one that argues that in 
the absence of a common power, states are forced to act amorally 
because there is no expectation of reciprocal compliance in a 
state of nature. Such an assumption lends itself to the 
argument, often voiced by Morgenthau, that states are obliged, by 
the very nature of the international system, to act according to 
self-interest in their dealings with one another. Beitz seeks to 
refute this analogy and establish instead, that "the appropriate 
analogue of individual autonomy in the international realm is not 
a natural autonomy but conformity of a society's political and
2economic institutions with appropriate principles of justice."
The first argument Beitz offers against realist scepticism 
is to point out that realists have misinterpreted Hobbes' state of
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nature as a situation which is incapable of sustaining moral life. 
According to Hobbes, "while there are moral principles or laws of 
nature in the state of nature, they do not bind to action in the 
absence of a common power".  ^ Thus the international sceptic is 
able to claim "that it is irrational (for a state) to adhere to 
moral rules in the absence of a reliable expectation that others 
will do the same".^ Beitz argues against this by saying morality 
is not absent in Hobbes' conception of a state of nature, because 
individuals in Hobbes' state of nature still have the inclination 
to make and observe covenants, thus showing some respect for 
principles of justice.^ Beitz therefore concludes that the state 
has a capacity for moral action, which goes unrecognised by 
adherents of the realist tradition.
The use of the state of nature analogy by international 
relations theorists is an attempt to show that while states and 
individuals are essentially different, when placed in a situation 
where there is no common power, states are likely to act in a 
similar way to how individuals would be expected to act in a state 
of nature. However to say that in the absence of a common power, 
groups of individuals and groups of states are likely to act in a 
similar way, is not to say that the individual and the state have 
essential characteristics in common.
Beitz provides additional support for his argument by 
observing that membership of the system of states has the capacity 
to influence a state's behaviour. External influences thus have 
the potential to force a state to behave in a moral way, 
regardless of the state's own preferences. To illustrate this 
point, Beitz offers four examples of the external influences upon 
a state's behaviour.
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First, the presence of transnational organisations has the 
potential to influence a state's decisions. Beitz points out 
that while individuals are the sole actors in a state of 
nature, states are not the only actors in international 
society.
The view that states are the only actors in international 
relations... denies the possibility that transnational 
associations of persons might have common interests that 
would motivate them to exert pressures for cooperation on 
their respective national governments. bl
While Beitz stops short of claiming that transnational 
organisations are prime movers in international relations, he does 
claim that they compete with states and implies that their 
interests may conflict with the interests of states. "Two 
important examples of politically effective transnational groups 
are multinational corporations and informal, transnational groups 
of middle-level bureaucrats. In each case, although to very 
different extents, it is clear that transnationally shared 
interests have sometimes led to substantial pressures on
7government foreign policy decisions."
The second external factor with the potential to influence a 
state's actions is the presence of stronger states. Beitz holds 
this up as another difference between individuals in a Hobbesian
ostate of nature and states in international society. Hobbes saw 
the fact that all individuals were relatively equal, in the sense 
that the weakest could kill the strongest in his sleep, as 
contributing to the uncertainty of a state of nature. In 
international relations, however, "it seems clear that this 
condition is not met; there are vast disparities in relative
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levels of national power".^ Beitz argues that the inequality of 
states at least confers the ability upon certain powers to play a 
moral role if they so desire. While the inequality of power "may 
be enough to show that compliance with moral rules is irrational 
for any state... it is not enough to say that some states (the 
strong ones) do not have obligations to try to change the rules of 
the international game so as to render compliance with moral rules 
more rational".^
The third influence upon states is economic interdependence.
Unlike individuals in a state of nature, states can be autonomous
in their dealings with one another to only a limited extent.
Beitz says the effect of international trade has reduced the
extent to which states can play out their conflicts without it
affecting their own interests. "...the success of states in
meeting domestic economic goals (e.g. full employment, control of
inflation, balanced economic growth) requires substantially higher
levels of cooperation among governments than has been the case in
the past".^ He cites common institutions like the International
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as
examples of institutions which "require stable environmental
conditions for their operation and a measure of consensual
1 2support, at least from their more significant members".
The fourth influence upon states is the possibility of 
sanctions imposed by the international community. While 
individuals in a state of nature have "no reliable expectations of 
reciprocal compliance by the actors with rules of cooperation in 
the absence of a superior power capable of enforcing these 
rules", Beitz points out the system of states possesses the 
means of exacting compliance to rules in the absence of an
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international police force. "These range from such mild sanctions 
as Community disapproval and censure by international 
organisations to coordinated policies of economic embargoes of 
offending states".14 In addition, a high level of voluntary 
compliance takes place in spheres like international 
communications, regional trade organisations and military 
alliances.
These four features of international society - the presence 
of multinational actors, the inequality of states, economic 
interdependence, and systemic mechanisms to enforce compliance - 
thus render it possible that a state's actions are not determined 
in a vacuum. As these four features combine to render the society 
of states more complex than realists would make out, Beitz 
therefore concludes that in the absence of a state's morality, it 
is possible for external influences to force a state to be moral.
Beitz thus claims to have demonstrated two things about the 
state: first, the state has the capacity for moral action, and
second, external influences have the capacity to make the state 
act in a moral way.
Beitz sees this discovery as having both "analytical and 
normative importance" for the discipline of international 
relations. Analytically, he says it provides sufficient reason 
for theorists to refute the simplistic assumption that states 
operate in a state of nature wherein the major problem is war,^ 
and that its normative importance lies in undermining the 
assumption that states can only be expected to act in their own 
interests.
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B e i t z  s e e s  the  e x i s t i n g  "norms" of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  
a s  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  s t a t e s  can o n ly  be e x p e c t e d  to  a c t  in  t h e i r  own 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  and  t h a t  in  th e  a b se n c e  of e x p e c t a t i o n s  of 
r e c i p r o c a l  c o m p l ia n c e  in a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ,  i t  i s  a l w a y s  in the  
s t a t e ' s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  go to  war.  "The p r e s c r i p t i v e  use  of the  
s t a t e  of  n a t u r e  p r o v i d e s  the  g r o u n d s  f o r  i n f e r r i n g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a 
r e a s o n  n o t  to  comply  w i t h  th e  l a w s  of n a t u r e  u n l e s s  th e  com pl iance
1 7
of  e v e ry o n e  e l s e  can be a s s u r e d " .
In  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  i s  n o t  a s t a t e  
o f  p e r p e t u a l  a n a r c h y ,  B e i t z  d i s p u t e s  the  idea  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s  i s  a p e rm a n e n t  s t a t e  of war,  and p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  c o n f l i c t  can be r e s o l v e d  w i t h o u t  r e s o r t i n g  t o  war.  But 
B e i t z ' s  o b s e r v a t i o n  of th e  e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e s  upon s t a t e s  has  no t  
d i s p r o v e n  th e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  s t a t e s  a c t  in t h e i r  own s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t .  B e i t z  has  m e re ly  shown t h a t  a number of f a c t o r s  may 
i n f l u e n c e  a s t a t e ' s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of where i t s  i n t e r e s t s  l i e ,  and 
t h a t  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  may be r e a l i s e d  by a v o id in g  o u t r i g h t  c o n f l i c t .
S t a t e s  have th e  c a p a c i t y  to  a c t  m o r a l ly  in th e  same way they  
have th e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  any  type  of a c t i o n ,  bu t  to  a rg u e  t h a t  s t a t e s  
p o s s e s s  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  i s  n o t  t o  say  t h a t  they  w i l l  use i t .  B e i t z  
i n t r o d u c e s  h i s  own t h e o r y  a b o u t  how s t a t e s  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  become 
m o ra l  in the  t h i r d  p a r t  of  h i s  book which  I w i l l  d i s c u s s  l a t e r  in 
t h i s  c h a p t e r .  In  P a r t  two of h i s  book B e i t z  i s  c o n c e rn e d  to  
d e v e l o p  f u r t h e r  h i s  n o r m a t i v e  t h e o r y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  by 
o v e r t u r n i n g  what he c o n s i d e r s  to  be the  two "old" norms of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y :  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  autonomy; and " the
1 fta b s e n c e  of any p r i n c i p l e  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e " .
He comes to  th e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  autonomy i s  
n o t  v a l i d  ( a t  l e a s t  n o t  in e v e r y  c ase )  and t h a t  the  p r i n c i p l e  of
54
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  has  a p l a c e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  th e o r y .
3.2 C r i t i q u e  o f  th e  P r i n c i p l e  o f  S t a t e  Autonomy
B e i t z  c r i t i c i s e s  th e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  s t a t e  au tonomy,  by p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  s t a t e s ,  u n l i k e  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  do n o t  have a r i g h t  t o  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  B e i t z  
n o t e s  t h a t  the  s t a t e  c a n n o t  be c o n s i d e r e d  a moral e n t i t y :
" s t a t e s . . .  d o  n o t  t h i n k  o r  w i l l  o r  a c t  in  p u r s u i t  o f  e n d s ;  o n l y  
p e o p le  (o r  p e r h a p s  s e n t i e n t  b e i n g s ) ,  a lo n e  o r  in g r o u p s ,  do t h e s e  
t h i n g s " . ^
The o n ly  p o s s i b l e  way s t a t e s  c o u ld  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  r i g h t  to
autonomy would be i f  t h a t  r i g h t  i s  d e r i v e d  from th e  r i g h t s  of
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h i n  a s t a t e ' s  b o u n d a r i e s .  "The H obbes ian  view
i n v i t e s  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  in  t e r m s  of
th e  i n t e r e s t s  of s t a t e s ;  b u t ,  even  i f  Hobbes' m e t a e t h i c s  were
a c c e p t e d ,  i t  i s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of p e r s o n s  t h a t  a r e  f u n d a m e n t a l ,  and
' n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s '  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o n ly  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e y  a r e  d e r i v e d
20from th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p e r s o n s " .
While a s t a t e ' s  r i g h t  t o  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  m igh t  be 
j u s t i f i e d  i f  i t  i s  "based  d i r e c t l y  on i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  members '  
r i g h t s  of  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . . .  ( t ) h e  presumed r i g h t  i s  l e s s  
a c c e p t a b l e  when i t  i s  n o t  l i v e s  b u t  a s t a t e ' s  t e r r i t o r i a l  
i n t e g r i t y  t h a t  i s  a t  s t a k e " .  B e i t z  a r g u e s  t h a t  s i n c e  p e o p le  
o f t e n  s u r v i v e  changes  in n a t i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s ,  o r  even c h an g e s  in 
g ove rnm en t ,  the  s t a t e  has  no r i g h t  t o  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  u n l e s s  i t  
i s  d e r i v e d  d i r e c t l y  from th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r i g h t  t o  s e l f -  
p r e s e r v a t i o n .  Thus when " n a t i o n a l  s u r v i v a l "  means more th an
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individual self-preservation, such as the protection of economic 
interests, for instance, the Hobbesian analogy is insufficient to 
explain the appropriate normative principles for state behaviour.
Beitz argues that the state's right to moral autonomy cannot 
be justified either by the analogy of the moral autonomy of 
individuals, nor by political theories of consent which infer that 
"civil government is a special case of freedom of association".
The state is neither an organic whole, as the domestic analogy 
infers, nor a free association of individuals, as consent theory 
would suggest. The only way for a state to be considered moral, 
Beitz suggests, is for its institutions to conform with 
"appropriate principles of domestic justice".^
Following on from this, Beitz argues that claims for self-
determination or economic independence are only valid when framed
in terms of justice. For example, when a group of individuals
claim the right to self-determination from colonial rule,
intervention on their behalf would only be justifiable on the
grounds that colonial rule is unjust, not on the grounds of a
right to self-determination. In view of the artificiality of
state boundaries and the legitimacy of multi-culturalism,
commonality of race, tribe, religion or culture is not sufficient
to justify a claim for self-determination. While Beitz admits
that some claims for self-determination may warrant intervention
on justice grounds, further "empirical research" is required to
determine the best political structure for assimilating the needs
of those who perceive themselves as outsiders in the political
process, in order to "identify those kinds of cases in which
71claims of self-determination could be justified".
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Arguments against economic dependence must also be justified 
in terms of justice principles, rather than the principle of 
national autonomy, because the moral objection to economic 
dependence is more likely to spring from the absence of "fair 
participatory institutions" in a satellite state than from theppfact of economic dependence.
Beitz sees the implications of the principle of state 
autonomy for international relations as twofold: first it provides 
a justification for the principle of non-intervention; and second, 
it denies the existence of any principles of distributive justice 
in international relations. Beitz therefore attempts to 
"apply" his new principle of state autonomy, by first re-assessing 
the blanket principle of non-intervention, which upholds a state's 
right to autonomy regardless of other principles, and second, by 
justifying a principle of international distributive justice.
In applying a modified principle of non-intervention to 
international relations, Beitz immediately encounters the problem 
of state compliance. The apparent danger in undermining the 
principle of state autonomy, is that it implies that a state would 
have the right to intervene in another state's affairs on the 
pretext that it is restoring justice. Appreciating the 
implication that a modified principle of non-intervention is open 
to abuse by states, Beitz outlines a principle of "permissable 
intervention" which attempts to accommodate the fact that states 
rarely act in accordance with moral principles unless the outcome 
will serve their own interests. As a result, Beitz offers a set 
of "permissable intervention" criteria that are so stringent that 
he ends up supporting the principle of autonomy, at least until 
states cease to act in their own interests.
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To guard against the possibility of paternalism on the part 
of powerful states towards weaker states, Beitz declares an act of 
intervention to be permissable only when the target state is 
unjust, and when it is not "likely to become just if left free
onfrom external interference". If there is no possibility that 
the target state will become just, an act of intervention is only 
permissable when it conforms to three more criteria:
1. it must promote justice and not be a self-serving action 
on the part of the intervening agent;
2. it must not run afoul of other relevant moral constraints 
on political action; and
3. it must not be too costly in terms of the other goals of
O 1international relations.
Beitz claims to have established a new normative principle 
for international relations - that a state’s right to autonomy 
should rest upon the conformity of its domestic institutions with 
appropriate principles of justice. While Beitz claims this 
principle has implications for the blanket application of the 
principle of non-intervention - "The non-intervention principle 
cannot be interpreted properly without considering the justice of 
the institutions of the states involved in particular instances of 
(potential) intervention" -until states become 
capable of acting in other than in their own interests, no act of 
intervention could be justified under Beitz's criteria.
A further endorsement of the state autonomy principle in 
Beitz's thesis is his implied support for the relativity of 
principles of justice. In concluding that "the analogue of the 
moral autonomy of persons, at the level of states, is a state's
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conformity with appropriate principles of domestic justice",
Beitz notes "it is possible that different principles of justice 
may apply to different types of societies in view of variations, 
e.g., in levels of socioeconomic development".^
Beitz's tacit support for the principle of state autonomy is 
developed further in the third section of his book, which seeks to 
dispose of another realist assumption: that the system of states
is inhospitable to the notion of distributive justice.
3.3 International Distributive Justice
Beitz is concerned to justify a concept of international 
distributive justice (ie. a distributive principle for states), 
not a concept of distributive justice based cn individual rights. 
Thus the basic thrust of Beitz's principle of international 
distributive justice is that residents of affluent states have 
obligations towards residents of less affluent states. A 
fundamental contradiction in Beitz's theory is his insistence that 
distributive justice should be carried out on a state-to-state 
basis, in spite of the fact that he justifies his "global 
distributive principle" by arguing the declining significance of 
the state. In establishing that individuals should have 
obligations towards individuals in other states, Beitz employs a 
re-interpretation of Rawls' principle of distributive justice.
Beitz sees the realists' denial of the relevance of 
international distributive justice as a further symptom of the 
inappropriate application of the Hobbesian analogy. Instead, he 
claims that contractarian ideas of justice, which rest on a common 
community of acceptance, are now relevant to world politics: "a
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strong case can be made on contractarian grounds that persons of 
diverse citizenship have distributive obligations to one another
o canalogous to those of citizens of the same state". To justify 
his principle of international distributive justice, Beitz 
reiterates the argument "that international relations is coming 
more and more to resemble domestic society in several respects 
relevant to the justification of principles of (domestic) social 
justice",
He then uses the argument of interdependence to criticise 
John Rawls' assumption that distributive justice can only occur 
within state boundaries, arguing instead for its conversion to an 
international principle of distributive justice.
Beitz's "application" of Rawls theory to international 
relations is simply to dispute Rawls' contention that principles 
of distributive justice can only be applied within the political 
context of the state. Instead, Beitz argues they should be used 
to judge the effectiveness of institutions, not just governments. 
Again, Beitz does not say how Rawls' principles could be "applied" 
to international relations, merely arguing their philosophical 
relevance to international theory.
Rawls' theory of justice is based on two principles, upon 
which if persons were living under a hypothetical "veil of 
ignorance" about their life circumstances and social position, 
they would all be likely to agree: that "each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all"; 
and that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit to the least
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a d v a n ta g e d ,  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  the  j u s t  s a v in g s  p r i n c i p l e  ( the  
' d i f f e r e n c e  p r i n c i p l e ' ) ;  and  (b) a t t a c h e d  to  o f f i c e s  and p o s i t i o n s
o o
open t o  a l l  under  c o n d i t i o n s  of f a i r  e q u a l i t y  of o p p o r t u n i t y . "
B e i t z  a c c e p t s  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  b u t  
c r i t i c i s e s  Rawls  f o r  h a v in g  an u n n e c e s s a r i l y  na r row  view of  how 
th e y  s h o u ld  be im p le m e n te d .  While  Rawls  t h i n k s  a s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  
a r r a n g e m e n t  w i t h i n  a s t a t e  i s  r e q u i r e d  to  im plem ent  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
j u s t i c e ,  B e i t z  t h i n k s  i t  would  b e t t e r  i f  i t  were t a k e n  t o  mean 
t h a t  " th e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  j u s t i c e  a p p l y  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
p r a c t i c e s  (w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e y  a r e  g e n u i n e l y  c o - o p e r a t i v e )  in 
which s o c i a l  a c t i v i t y  p r o d u c e s  r e l a t i v e  o r  a b s o l u t e  b e n e f i t s  or 
b u r d e n s  t h a t  would n o t  e x i s t  i f  th e  s o c i a l  a c t i v i t y  d i d  n o t  take  
p l a c e " .
B e i t z  r e i t e r a t e s  o b s e r v a t i o n s  abo u t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  
which  he s e e s  as  j u s t i f y i n g  the  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
of j u s t i c e  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  th e o r y .  F i r s t ,  he s a y s  Rawls  was 
m i s t a k e n  in a s su m in g  t h a t  s t a t e  b o u n d a r i e s  formed d i s c r e t e  
s o c i e t i e s  w i t h i n  which  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  p r i n c i p l e s  c o u ld  a p p l y ,  and 
a r g u e s  t h a t  th e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  of s t a t e s  means t h a t  s t a t e s  a r e  no 
l o n g e r  au tonomous  u n i t s .  I n s t e a d ,  he a r g u e s  the  s t a t e  sh o u ld  be 
seen  m ere ly  a s  a g roup  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r a c t i c e s ,  in which  
c a s e ,  a m o d i f i e d  v e r s i o n  of  Rawls '  t h e o r y  would a p p l y . ^
A second c r i t i c i s m  o f  Rawls '  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  Rawls  o v e r l o o k s  
the  f a c t  of the  unequa l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  among 
s t a t e s .  U n l ike  human t a l e n t s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
a r e  n o t  "g iven"  by th e  n a t u r e  of t h i n g s ,  bu t  must be a p p r o p r i a t e d .  
T h e r e f o r e  an y o n e ' s  d e c i s i o n  to  a p p r o p r i a t e  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
w a r r a n t s  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  "In a w o r ld  of s c a r c i t y . . .  ( t ) h e
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appropriation of valuable resources by some will leave others 
comparatively, and perhaps fatally, disadvantaged. Those 
deprived without justification of scarce resources needed to 
sustain and enhance their lives might well press claims to 
equitable shares".^
Economic interdependence among states further exacerbates 
the ill-effects of an unequal distribution of resources. Factors 
which are the inevitable result of interdependence, like the power 
of multinational corporations, the vulnerability of resource-poor 
countries, the difficulty of keeping control of one's domestic 
economy and the concentration of power in the hands of ruling 
elites, all serve to widen the income gap between rich and poor 
countries, "even though it produces absolute gains for almost all 
of them".^ Therefore, because interdependence produces 
"significant aggregate benefits and costs that would not exist if 
states were economically autarkic"^ we should not let state 
boundaries get in the way of applying a global principle of 
distributive justice.
Beitz's principle of global distributive justice supposedly
applies to persons, not states, "in the sense that it is the
globally least advantaged representative person (or group of
persons) whose position is to be maximised".^ Therefore "if one
takes the position of the least - advantaged group as an index of
distributive justice, there is no a priori reason to think that
the membership of this group will be coextensive with that of any 
4 Sexisting state".
Beitz's theory is premised on the assumption that the state 
is declining as a political force in international relations thus
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rendering international relations more like domestic political 
society, and thereby more receptive to principles of global 
distributive justice. Although Beitz's justification for 
international distributive justice is based on the observation 
that the influence of the state is declining, he endorses the 
state as the mechanism through which a global distributive 
principle will be given effect. Beitz recognises the 
contradiction in his argument and says that although states may 
not qualify as recipients of global distributive principles in 
theory, they are, nevertheless, "the primary 'subjects' of 
international distributive responsibilities", and as such, "...are 
more appropriately situated than individual persons to carry out 
whatever policies are required to implement global principles".^
Beitz recognises that reliance on states as a mechanism to 
give effect to global distributive justice may distort the 
application of the global principle and mitigate against 
individuals receiving their rightful share. It is therefore 
important for "intrastate inequalities to be minimised... to 
maximise the position of the (globally) least advantaged group".^ 
Nevertheless he maintains that "perhaps intercountry 
redistribution should be viewed as a second-best solution in the 
absence of a better strategy for satisfying a global difference 
principle".
So how does the state become sufficiently moral to put 
Beitz's distributive principles into practice? His argument that 
a global distributive principle should be incorporated into state 
practice, and that states have the potential to be moral does not 
alter the fact that states appear more keen to pursue their own 
interests than to defend principles of distributive justice.
63
3.4 Realising the Ideal in a Non-Ideal World
Beitz tries to overcome the problem of realising the ideal 
in international theory in three ways: first, by comparing the 
transition to an ideal society with the transition from a 
Hobbesian state of nature; second by postulating a Kantian theory 
of change about the role of ideal theory in a non-ideal world; and 
third, by arguing that moral ideas have a persuasive force.
Beitz admits that the problem of "realising the ideal" in 
international relations may be more difficult than in a domestic 
political context "because the institutional framework of 
international relations is less capable of bringing about the 
shifts in the distribution of wealth and power required by the 
global difference p r i n c i p l e . H o w e v e r  he argues that this 
problem of "the absence of reliable expectations of reciprocal 
compliance"-^ in international relations is mitigated by other 
factors specific to the international context which could work in 
favour of changes taking effect.
Beitz highlights these features by comparing the current
qinternational situation to^situation prevailing in Hobbes' state 
of nature, showing that more assurances of reciprocal compliance 
of available now than were available at the time man made his 
transition from the state of nature:
1. The risks of voluntary compliance are not as severe as 
they would be in a state of nature - one is risking only relative 
deprivation rather than death for supporting moral principles;
2. "there are greater possibilities of co-ordination in 
international society then in a state of nature. The assurance
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problem is more easily solved.";
3. the variety of international institutions already in 
existence "can be adjusted to improve the justice of the 
distribution they produce, while the state of nature lacks 
analogous institutions bearing on personal security".
This tells us nothing about the prospects for change in 
international relations, not least because it portrays the 
original contract as an historical event, against which current 
events can be compared, and secondly because it employs the 
"prescriptive" reasoning for which Beitz so roundly criticises the 
realists. As Kant pointed out, the original contract is a mere 
"idea of reason" which has practical implications for the 
justification we give to framing laws, but no significance as a
c nfact in itself. "Such an assumption would mean that we would
have first to prove from history that some nation, whose rights
and obligations have been passed down to us, did in fact perform
such an act, and handed down some authentic record or legal
instrument... before we could regard ourselves as bound by a pre-
S 3existing civil constitution".
At best Beitz is implying that interdependence among states 
facilitates a sense of "world community" less hostile to 
principles of justice. Against those who argue that 
international society is hostile to the persuasive force of moral 
ideals, Beitz argues they "misunderstand the relation between 
ideal theory and the real w o r l d " . " T h e  ideal cannot be 
undermined simply by pointing out that it cannot be achieved at
c cpresent". Beitz claims there are only two classes of 
impediments to the realisation of an ideal: "impediments... that 
are themselves capable of modification over time" and
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" im p e d im e n t s  t h a t  a r e  u n a l t e r a b l e  and u n a v o i d a b l e " . ^  Only in 
th e  l a t t e r  c a s e  can one "appea l  t o  th e  c l a i m  of i m p o s s i b i l i t y  in 
a r g u i n g  a g a i n s t  an i d e a l ,  s i n c e ,  in the  fo rm er  c a s e ,  such an 
a rg u m e n t  can  be d e f e a t e d  by p o i n t i n g  o u t  the  m u t a b i l i t y  of those  
s o c i a l  f a c t s  t h a t  a r e  supposed  to  r e n d e r  the  i d e a l  u n a t t a i n a b l e  in  
t h e  p r e s e n t " .
B e i t z  t h e r e f o r e  c l a i m s  t h a t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s o c i e t y  d o e s  n o t  y e t  r e s e m b le  d o m e s t i c  s o c i e t y  in the  i m p o r t a n t  
a r e a s  of  p o s s e s s i n g  a common power o r  a sense  of community ,  i s  
s i m p l y  an " im p e d im e n t  t o  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of a g l o b a l  d i f f e r e n c e
c p
p r i n c i p l e  w h ich  a r e  c a p a b le  of m o d i f i c a t i o n  o v e r  t im e" .
B e i t z  a r g u e s  t h a t  h i s  mora l i d e a s  w i l l  have a p e r s u a s i v e  
f o r c e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  by c i t i n g  K an t ' s  maxim t h a t  
" . . . t h e  i d e a  t h a t  s o m e th in g  which has  h i t h e r t o  been u n s u c c e s s f u l  
w i l l  n e v e r  be s u c c e s s f u l  does  n o t  j u s t i f y  anyone in abandoning  
even  a p r a g m a t i c  o r  t e c h n i c a l  a im . . .  T h i s  a p p l i e s  even to  moral 
a i m s ,  w h ich ,  so  long  a s  i t  i s  n o t  d e m o n s t r a b l y  i m p o s s i b l e  to
C Q
f u l f i l  them,  amount  to  d u t i e s " .  Thus B e i t z  a s s u r e s  us ,  l i k e
B u l l  and  N a r d i n ,  t h a t  the  s t a t e  w i l l  a c c e p t  moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
in  w o r ld  a f f a i r s  and  i s  c a p a b le  of  c a r r y i n g  ou t  " d u t i e s "  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  even when such  d u t i e s  do n o t  s e r v e  i t s  own 
i n t e r e s t s .
B e i t z  c l a i m s  h i s  i d e a l  t h e o r y  has  s e v e r a l  v a l i d  a p p l i c a t i o n s
t o  the  " n o n i d e a l  w or ld"  in  the  s e n s e  t h a t  i d e a l s  p r o v id e  b o th  "a
g o a l  to w ard  which  e f f o r t s  a t  p o l i t i c a l  chance sh o u ld  a i m " ^  and a
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  g l o b a l  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  in the  fa c e  of s t a t i s t  
f) 1c o n c e r n s .
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The "practical consequences" of these theoretical aims, 
include "strengthen(ing) the moral case for foreign aid".
While Beitz recognises the state to state mechanism of giving aid 
does not necessarily ensure that aid gets to "the least advantaged 
person whose position is to be maximised", he says "second-best
c opolicies are usually better than none". At best, in countries 
where "extreme poverty is partially a result of large domestic 
income inequalities, pressure should be brought if possible for 
changes in policy or structural reforms aimed at reducing income 
inequalities".^
The global difference principle should also have practical
implications for the reform of the international economic order
and rules governing international trade should be adjusted "to
promote re-distribution toward poor countries" (eg. prohibit
srestrictive tariffs and so on)
A third practical application of the global difference 
principle is that conscientous objectors who refuse to join their 
state's armed forces "would have far broader justifications" for 
doing so, particularly in the case of a war being waged by an 
affluent nation against a poor one. ^
While Beitz provides a novel philosophical justification for 
a principle of global distributive justice, his analysis suffers 
from a failure to examine the possible causes of injustice in the 
society of states. While at various stages of his analysis,
Beitz acknowledges the many state-based impediments to effecting 
just change in international society, his theory ignores the 
realities of state power, except when he tries to accommodate it 
in his criteria of permissable intervention.
67
Beitz's critique of the principle of state autonomy would 
have the potential to undermine the prevailing states-rights 
arguments were it not for the fact that Beitz's own approach is 
hamstrung by a statist perspective. By attempting to reconcile 
states' rights with the rights of individuals in a principle of 
global distributive justice which nevertheless recognises states 
as the primary objects of distributive justice, Beitz fails to 
address the enormous impediment to the realisation of principles 
of justice which is posed by the state.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY
"The starting point of international relations is the 
existence of states, or independent political communities, 
each of which possess a government and asserts sovereignty 
in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface 
and a particular segment of the human population ...states 
assert, in relation to this territory and population, what 
may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy 
over all other authorities within that territory and 
population ...(and) ...external sovereignty, by which is 
meant... independence of outside authorities.
In the previous chapters, I examined the attempts of three 
international relations theorists to justify their conceptions of 
world order. While each author would claim to have a different 
approach to the question of order in international theory, once 
the contradictions in their arguments are exposed, a common 
element appears in their expectations of the state. Bull sees 
international stability resulting from the leadership of the Great 
Powers; Nardin's prescription for world order rests on customary 
international law; and Beitz is optimistic about the evolution of 
a more co-operative and communicative states system.
While the state is recognised as a fundamental unit of world 
order, Bull, Nardin and Beitz see the state's right to sovereignty 
as essential to the maintenance of order among states. This is 
based on the assumption that states adhere to an international 
code of conduct which respects the right of all states to 
sovereignty over their internal population and external affairs.
In the absence of a supreme authority over states, Bull and Nardin 
imply that states can only be expected to adhere to a code of 
conduct which affirms their own right to exist. This code of 
conduct does not therefore impose the level of restraint upon
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States that is imposed upon individuals within a domestic 
political order. A state is entitled to pursue its own ends, "as 
long as it does not interfere with the equal rights of others".^
Implicit in this defence of the principle of state 
sovereignty is the argument that the state's right to autonomy 
overrides any claims by individuals against it. Nevertheless 
Bull, Nardin and Beitz maintain that upholding the principle of 
state sovereignty is not at variance with promoting the common 
good. They do not claim that the principle of state sovereignty 
can be reconciled with the principle of individual rights.
Rather they imply that an order based on respecting states' rights 
will ultimately benefit individuals because maximising orderly 
relations among states minimises international conflict thus 
enabling human societies to prosper without the constant threat of 
war.
This conception of world order contains two fundamental 
assumptions about the state which will be explored below. The 
first assumption relates to the relationship between the state and 
the individual, depicting the state as a representative 
institution capable of promoting the common good. The idea that 
individuals should make no claims outside of the state implies 
that their needs are recognised by some form of social contract 
with a sovereign power, or that values are so culturally relative 
that conceptions about what constitutes the common good differ 
substantially from one state to the next.
The second assumption relates to the state in international 
society, in that the state is expected to be a voluntary actor in 
world affairs, capable of accepting the "rules" of an
73
international "code of conduct" and carrying out its "duty" to 
respect the rights of other states. In defining the principles 
of this "code of conduct" Bull, Nardin and Beitz assume that the 
principle of state sovereignty is a fundamental principle 
of international behaviour in that states can only be expected to 
respect a principle which affirms their right to exist.
4.1 The Representative State
Nardin claims that recognising the principle of state 
sovereignty reflects the consideration that "individuals have 
rights largely as members of a political community - that is, as 
citizens of states". Bull also asserts that the rights of 
individuals can only be addressed within states and represented by 
states in the international arena. The views of "private 
individuals", Bull says, whether they be "self-appointed 
spokesmen" or representatives of non-government organisations, 
possess no "authority" in international relations because they 
"are not the outcome of any political process of the assertion and 
reconciliation of interests".^ He goes on to claim that "...the 
views of these individuals provide even less of an authoritative 
guide to the common good of mankind than do the views of the 
spokesman (sic) of sovereign states, even unrepresentative or 
tyrannical ones, which at least have claims to speak for some part
7of mankind larger than themselves".
The idea that states afford individuals rights as members of 
a political community suggests that states are representative 
institutions and that soverigns rule by popular consent. This 
idea of a social contract received its fullest and and most
ooriginal expression in the work of Thomas Hobbes. In Leviathan,
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Hobbes a rg u e d  t h a t  a s o v e r e i g n  r u l e r  was o b l i g e d  t o  p romote  the  
common good u nde r  th e  t e r m s  of an o r i g i n a l  c o v en a n t  made be tween  
him and  h i s  s u b j e c t s .  Accord ing  to  Hobbes'  t h e o r y  of  the  s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t ,  s o v e r e i g n s  o b t a i n e d  t h e i r  r i g h t  to  a b s o l u t e  power on the  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e y  would p r o t e c t  t h e i r  s u b j e c t s  from the  
t y r a n n y  of  a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .  The s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  i s  th e  absence  
o f  o r d e r  in  human c o m m u n i t i e s ,  where man l i v e s  under  th e  c o n s t a n t  
t h r e a t  o f  d e a t h  from h i s  f e l l o w  man, in  a l i f e  t h a t  i s  " s o l i t a r y ,
Q
p o o re ,  n a s t y ,  b r u t i s h  and  s h o r t " .
Hobbes a l s o  g r a n t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  the  r i g h t  t o  r e b e l  a g a i n s t  
t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n  i f  he f a i l e d  to  keep  up h i s  s i d e  of  t h e  co v en a n t ,  
i e .  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  when th e  s o v e r e i g n  d i r e c t l y  t h r e a t e n e d  the 
l i v e s  o f  h i s  s u b j e c t s  when i t  was n o t  in  e s s e n t i a l  s e r v i c e  to  the  
s t a t e ,  o r  when he f a i l e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a s u f f i c i e n t  d e g re e  of 
i n t e r n a l  o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  s o c i e t y  d e s c e n d in g  i n t o  a s t a t e  of 
n a t u r e . ^
The O b l i g a t i o n  o f  s u b j e c t s  to  the  S o v e r a ig n ,  i s  u n d e r s to o d  
t o  l a s t  a s  l o n g ,  and no l o n g e r ,  t h a t  the  power l a s t e t h ,  by 
which he i s  a b l e  to  p r o t e c t  them. For the  r i g h t  men have by 
N a tu re  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e m s e l v e s ,  when none e l s e  can p r o t e c t - , ,  
them, can by no c o v e n a n t  be r e l i n q u i s h e d .  11
The p rob lem  w i t h  a s s u m in g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s o v e r e i g n t y  i s  t h a t  
s o v e r e i g n s  p o s s e s s  s o u r c e s  of power o t h e r  than p o p u l a r  co n se n t .  
Even in  modern d e m o c r a c i e s  where th e  " w i l l  of t h e  p e o p le"  i s  
s u p p o se d ly  s o v e r e i g n ,  th e  go v e rn m en t ,  once formed and in  charge  of 
th e  m ach ine ry  of  s t a t e ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  a power s e p a r a t e  from the  
peo p le  who h e lp ed  t o  fo rm i t .
A fu n d a m e n ta l  a d v a n t a g e  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  p o s s e s s e s  ove r  the  
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h i n  i t  i s  t h e  power t o  d e f i n e  and l e g i t i m i s e  the
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political process. Beitz points out that the mere fact of 
apparent political consent does not render the state an organic 
whole, because, "few, if any, governments ... are, in fact, free 
associations". States are very much "a fixed part of the 
social landscape into which people are born and within which all 
but the most fortunate are confined regardless of whether or not 
they expressly agree to their terms of association". Beitz 
dismisses the possibility that general compliance among a state's 
population is evidence of a form of tacit consent, since 
"institutions (of government) define the processes through which 
consent can or cannot be expressed".^
If a head of state chooses not to rely upon popular consent
for its legitimacy, as head of state, a sovereign has access to
alternate sources of power. Economic
power, for example, enables a sovereign to amass private wealth
from internal as well as external sources, including the receipt
of overseas aid. In spite of the influence of transnational
corporations, the head of state still possesses ultimate control
over the distribution of economic resources within the state.^
Extreme inequalties in the distribution of resources within very
poor states have been attributed, in part, to the tendency of
ruling elites to accumulate resources at the expense of the mass
of the population. A head of state also possesses the right to
maintain a standing army, which while purportedly for external
1 ->defence, is often used to quell internal dissent.
Heads of state thus obtain legitimacy from a system of 
states which affords them political, economic, and military power. 
The assumption of representative sovereignty in international 
theory is based on an extremely narrow view of the state which
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i g n o r e s  the  c o m p l e x i t i e s  of s t a t e  power and the i n c r e a s i n g l y  
l i m i t e d  e x t e n t  t o  which  a s t a t e  can be assumed t o  r e p r e s e n t  s o c i a l  
i n t e r e s t s .
T h e o r i s t s  o f  W es te rn  P o l i t i c a l  Thought  have long  been
engaged  in a n a l y s i n g  th e  de g re e  t o  which a s t a t e  can be c o n s i d e r e d
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and i n v a r i a b l y  come to  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  even  in
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  d e m o c r a c i e s ,  the  power of the  s t a t e  f a r  o u tw e ig h s
1 ftth e  power of i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  c h a l l e n g e  i t .  Yet,  W r ig h t  n o t e s ,
i t  i s  " s u r p r i s i n g "  how r e c e n t  works  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y
r e f l e c t  " the  c o n t i n u e d  sway of the  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  t r a d i t i o n  in  
1 ftv a r i o u s  g u i s e s " .  W r ig h t  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  "a fu n d a m e n ta l  b re a k  
w i t h  c o n t r a c t  t h e o r y  w i l l  have to  be made b e fo re  p o l i t i c a l  
t h e o r i s t s ,  w h e th e r  e m p i r i c a l  o r  n o r m a t i v e ,  d o m e s t i c  o r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  w i l l  be a b l e  to  c o n f r o n t  the  v i o l e n c e ,  war ,  
r e p r e s s i o n ,  p o v e r t y  and  a n a r c h y  w h ich  a r e  r i f e  in so  many p a r t s  of 
th e  w o r ld  t o d a y . ^
A f u r t h e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  view t h a t  q u e s t i o n s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  s h o u ld  be c o n f i n e d  to  th e  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
a r e n a  i s  t h a t  v a l u e s  a b o u t  what  c o n s t i t u t e s  human r i g h t s  a r e  
r e l a t i v e  be tween  s t a t e s .  A ccord ing  to  c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i v i s t s ,  the  
s t a t e  i s  the  o n ly  l e g i t i m a t e  v o i c e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  
b e c a u s e  of  " the  l a ck  o f  a common A lm ig h ty ,  of a c o h e r e n t  and
7 1p e r v a s i v e  m o r a l i t y  which  t r a n s c e n d s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r o n t i e r s " .
In i t s  most e x t r e m e  form,  c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i v i t i s m  i m p l i e s  t h a t
" the  mere p o s s e s s i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  m ora l  o p in io n s  by a man, o r  a
s o c i e t y ,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e n d e r  t h a t  o p i n i o n ,  no m a t t e r  how
y ya r b i t r a r y ,  r i g h t  f o r  t h a t  man o r  s o c i e t y " .  However Suganami 
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  a m o ra l  r e l a t i v i s t  would t h e r e f o r e  be o b l i g e d  t o
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accept the right of any state or society to go to war, or to 
intervene in the affairs of another state, if its moral dictates 
said it was right to do so.
The relativist assumptions most common to international 
theory deny the possibility of any universal agreement on 
questions of individual rights. Bozeman argues that 
fundamentalist Islamic states cannot be expected to conform to a 
Western dominated world order based western principles.
...by rejecting rational modes of thought, the Arabs - and 
Muslims in general - rendered themselves constitutionally 
distrustful of all abstract or a priori universal concepts, 
such as 'the law of nature,' 'ideal justice,'and the like, 
which have had such a decisive normative effect-on the 
evolution of secular legal systems in the West. 4
A fundamental problem with the concept of cultural
relativism in international relations relates to the assumption of
a connection between cultural or religious identity and the state.
The state is rarely an association based on common culture - the
Government of Papua New Guinea, for instance, represents some 700
distinct cultural groups. Ethnic and cultural diversity is a
feature of most states in the international system, yet it does
not prevent states from conforming to accepted norms of behaviour
7 Sin their relations with one another.
Nardin makes the further point that while states may differ 
in superficial ways, there are common elements in all cultures 
which derive from the universalism of human experience. "The 
universal principles of morality are those that work under the 
recurrent circumstances of human existence and that have tended in 
consequence to be selected and perpetuated wherever there are 
permanent human communities". Nardin cites as examples the
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fact that all cultures manifest practices which relate to the 
universal elements of human existence, such as the protection of 
children, regulation of sexual conduct and ritualistic treatment 
of the dead. This level of commonality has been found across 
culture, time and place, in traditions which emanate from the
0 7unversalism of human experience.
Nardin nevertheless argues for states' rights to be prior to 
individual rights because the state is "an independent political 
community free to make and amend its own laws and to enjoy its own 
religious and cultural life, subject only to those limitations 
that are necessary to reconcile the liberty of one community with 
that of others".^ It could therefore be argued that while human 
experience is universal, states have different mechanisms for 
accommodating individuals' needs.
The problems inherent in the notion of a social contract 
have been discussed above, and Barrington Moore has identified 
recurring elements in all forms of social organisation across time 
and place, which suggest the existence of universal concepts of 
social injustice: "even the simplest known societies display in
at least a rudimentary form some principles of social 
inequality". This agreement was located in "indications of a 
widespread feeling that people, even the most humble members of a 
society, ought to have enough resources to do their job in the 
social order, and that there is something morally wrong or even
O Aoutrageous when these resources are unavailable". A universal 
sense of injustice was apparent in all social orders, across time 
and place, at "failures of authority to meet its express or 
implied obligation to provide security and advance collective 
purposes".
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A lthough  t h e r e  i s  e v id e n c e  o f  "a c o re  of i n a r t i c u l a t e  
a g r e e m e n t  among human b e i n g s  a s  t o  what c o n s t i t u t e s  u n j u s t
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t r e a t m e n t  of t h e m s e l v e s  of t h e i r  f e l l o w  human b e i n g s " ,  i t  s h o u ld  
a l s o  be r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  heads  o f  s t a t e  acknowledge common 
p r i n c i p l e s  of f u n d a m e n ta l  human r i g h t s ,  b o th  in t h e i r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  and in  th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  th e y  o f f e r  f o r  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s .  Even i f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e s  have l i t t l e  or  no 
e f f e c t  on i n d i v i d u a l s '  l i v e s ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  human r i g h t s  a r e  
acknow ledged  in  th e  p r e a m b l e s  o f  most o f  the  w o r l d ' s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  S o v i e t  U n ion 's  a t t e s t s  t o  a
-D O
c o n s e n s u s  a b o u t  w ha t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  s h o u ld  be.
Levi p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  most s t a t e s  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  pay l i p -  
s e r v i c e  t o  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n s  o r  
s en se  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . ^  Even th o s e  s t a t e s  who a rg u e  t h a t  
human r i g h t s  i s s u e s  a r e  c u l t u r a l l y  r e l a t i v e  w i l l  r a r e l y  a d m i t  t o  
i g n o r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  norms l i k e  human r i g h t s  when th e y  a r e
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a c c u s e d  of do ing  so in  p u b l i c .
. . . t h e  c l e a r e s t  e v i d e n c e  f o r  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  ou r  v a l u e s  
o v e r  t im e  i s  th e  unchang ing  c h a r a c t e r  of the  l i e s  s o l d i e r s  
and s t a t e s m e n  t e l l .  They l i e  in o r d e r  to  j u s t i f y  
t h e m s e l v e s ,  and so th ey  d e s c r i b e  f o r  us the  l i n e a m e n t s  o f ^ fi 
j u s t i c e .  Jt>
While heads  o f  s t a t e  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  pay l i p - s e r v i c e  t o  
u n i v e r s a l  v a l u e s ,  t h e y  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a c t  in a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h
■3 ~)
p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  r e s p e c t  i n d i v i d u a l s '  r i g h t s .  D efend ing  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  may 
t h e r e f o r e  be j u s t i f i a b l e  on the  g ro u n d s  t h a t  i t  i s  th e  o n ly  
p r i n c i p l e  s t a t e s  a r e  w i l l i n g  to  a c c e p t .
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4.2 An I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Code o f  Conduct
The id e a  of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  code of  co n d u c t ,  o r  a " m o r a l i t y  
o f  s t a t e s " ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B u l l ,  N ard in  and B e i t z  a s s u m e s ,  f i r s t ,  
t h a t  s t a t e s  a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  v o l u n t a r y  s e l f - r e s t r a i n t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a 
s e t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  and second ,  t h a t  t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  
p r i n c i p l e  upon which  t h i s  code of conduct  i s  b a s e d ,  i s  the  
p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y .  The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  th e  second 
a s s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t  s t a t e s  can o n ly  be e x p e c t e d  t o  a d h e r e  t o  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  w hich  i n d i r e c t l y  s e rv e  t h e i r  own 
i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s i n c e  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  
a f f i r m s  th e  r i g h t  of  a l l  s t a t e s  t o  e x i s t ,  they  can be e x p e c t e d  to  
r e s p e c t  i t  above a l l  o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e s .
Thus i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  i s  seen  t o  be th e  p r o d u c t  of  s t a t e s  
o b s e r v i n g  a s e t  o f  r u l e s ,  " a t  th e  h e a r t  o f . . (w h ich )  i s  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  e a c h  s t a t e  a c c e p t s  the  d u ty  to  r e s p e c t  the  
s o v e r e i g n t y  o r  supreme j u r i s d i c t i o n  of e v e r y  o t h e r  s t a t e  o v e r  i t s  
own c i t i z e n s  and dom ain ,  in  r e t u r n  f o r  th e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  s i m i l a r
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r e s p e c t  f o r  i t s  own s o v e r e i g n t y  from o t h e r  s t a t e s " .
The idea  t h a t  s t a t e s  w i l l  a c c e p t  a code of  c o n d u c t  which 
r e s p e c t s  the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  d raws  h e a v i l y  on th e  
a n a lo g y  be tw een  th e  s t a t e  and th e  i n d i v i d u a l .  J u s t  a s  Hobbes 
d e p i c t e d  the  d e f e n c e  of human l i f e  a s  the  va lue  most p r e c i o u s  to  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  B u l l ,  N a rd in  and B e i t z  see  the  p r o t e c t i o n  of 
s o v e r e i g n t y  ( i e .  " l i f e " )  a s  the  v a lu e  most fu n d a m e n ta l  t o  s t a t e s .  
The id ea  of a code o f  c o n d u c t  a l s o  r e f l e c t s  an a n a lo g y  w i t h  human 
s o c i e t i e s  in the  s e n s e  t h a t  " w i t h o u t  a minimum o f . . .  f r i e n d l y  
b e h a v i o u r  (which i s  o f  c o u r s e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  p l e n t y  o f  
c o m p e t i t i o n  of v a r i o u s  k in d s )  a community  c anno t  e x i s t  a t  a l l  and
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O Qits members cannot survive". The state is thus depicted as a 
responsible member of the international "community", voluntarily 
adhering to a code of conduct both out of a sense of self-interest 
and from a duty to the society as a whole. "Trying to do one's 
duty as one sees it is... to a striking extent... what states are 
engaged in".^®
The idea of the state as capable of voluntary self-restraint 
has widespread currency in many different approaches to 
international theory^ and underpins each of the three theories 
discussed above. According to Bull, "...the idea of 
international society identifies states as members of this society 
and the units competent to carry out political tasks within it,
« 4 9including the tasks necessary to make the basic rules effective. 
The responsible state is thus capable of adhering to rules of 
conduct and carrying out its "duties" in the international arena. 
It is also willing to accept the restraints of international law, 
according to Nardin, and it is capable of reviewing the principles 
which govern its conduct, according to Beitz.
This conception of international relations also assumes that 
states can be expected to act in concert to uphold the principle 
of state sovereignty. Vincent attributes the willingness of 
states to uphold the principle of state sovereignty to "three 
extra-legal factors": "a sense of moral duty; self interest; or 
forced obedience to the rule".^ States do possess the power to 
act in concert to influence the policies of another state, 
although the extent to which such action is successful depends 
upon the degree to which the legitimacy of the target state 
depends on acceptance by the international community, as the 
examples of South Africa and Israel illustrate.^ "In a very
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real sense, sovereignty is something created or at any rate 
bestowed by the international community. If other states do not 
accept a particular entity... then the status of a sovereign state 
has not been b e s t o w e d . T h e  effectiveness of international 
pressure is however mitigated by factors such as the power of the 
target state, or its ability to attract patronage from other 
powerful states.
In determining whether respect for the principle of state 
sovereignty does influence states' behaviour, I will examine the 
case of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978-1979 which 
resulted in the downfall of a genocidal dictator, Idi Amin.^ 
Tanzania launched an invasion of neighbouring Uganda in November 
1978 ostensibly to retaliate for a Ugandan army incursion over the 
Tanzanian border. Five months later, Tanzanian troops reached 
the Ugandan capital Kampala, and toppled Idi Amin's regime, which 
during its eight years in power had obtained a world-wide 
reputation for brutality and abuse of human rights.^
The reaction of the international community during the
dispute was mixed. The Organisation of African Unity did not
support Tanzania's action, on the grounds that it violated the
principle of state sovereignty.^7 Libya supported Uganda with
arms and supplies "motivated by the desire to help an anti-
imperialist, anti-Zionist leader of a muslim state". Kenya
also supported Idi Amin because it received the benefits of trade
49from a land-locked Uganda through its ports.
On the other hand, Tanzania received the tacit support of 
states who had nothing to gain from supporting either side.
Amin's request for assistance from the United Nations "fell on
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deaf ears"~^ and the Russians, who "had become increasingly 
embarrassed by their association with Amin"^ kept a low profile 
during the conflict and gradually withdrew their support. The 
Western states who had negligible strategic interests in the 
region remained uninvolved until the intervention was successfully 
completed, whereupon they accorded the new regime diplomatic 
recognition and offered generous levels of financial support. 
Thomas concludes that the level of financial assistance offered to 
the new regime by the West amounted to "a tacit approval of the
c oTanzanian action".
In looking at this incident for indications of the 
parameters of the international code of conduct, the first 
conclusion to be drawn is that the policies of states on both 
sides of the dispute appear to be driven by a calculation of self- 
interest. While Tanzania may have had a moral motive in its 
efforts to remove Idi Amin, it also had a strategic interest in 
"weakening the cause of a troublesome and threatening neighbour 
s t a t e " . T h e  policies of the states like Libya and Kenya were 
influenced by a perception of their strategic interests, and the 
small, vulnerable states who made up the Organisation of African 
Unity, upheld the principle of state sovereignty as a protection 
of their own interests, aware that "all... historical examples of
c c:intervention show the powerful correcting the weak" and 
concerned about giving license to a flood of humanitarian 
interventions.
While members of the wider international community tacitly 
supported the Tanzanian action, Thomas concludes this was only 
possible because of the absence more direct strategic concerns.
She says that Tanzania's intervention was "more acceptable" to
84
t h e s e  s t a t e s  than  c o m p ar ab le  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  l i k e  th e  V ie tnam ese  
i n v a s i o n  o f  Kampuchea and th e  I n d i a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  E a s t  
P a k i s t a n ,  b e ca u se  of th e  a b se n c e  of q u e s t i o n s  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  
" . . . t h e  r e g i o n  was of  no g r e a t  s t r a t e g i c  im p o r t a n c e  t o  any of the  
w o r l d ' s  m a jo r  pow ers . . .  t h e  c o n f l i c t  was c l e a r l y  n o t  p a r t  of a 
b r o a d e r  h o s t i l i t y . . .  (and) T a n z an ia  c o u ld  n o t  be r e g a r d e d  a s  th e  
d o m in a n t  and  p o w e r f u l  p r e d a t o r y  n e ig h b o u r . . .  r a n k i n g  a s  one of
c c
A f r i c a ' s  p o o r e s t  s t a t e s " .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  a s t a t e  w i t h  more 
im m e d ia te  i n t e r e s t s  a t  s t a k e ,  l i k e  Kenya, was adam ant  in  p rom ot ing  
i t s  own i n t e r e s t s .  Even though  "Kenya had the  power t o  e x e r t  the  
most  l e v e r a g e  and  p r o b a b l y  w i t h  the  l e a s t  h a r d s h i p  and
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i n c o n v e n i e n c e  t o  he r  own p o p u l a t i o n . . .  she  would n o t  use  i t " .
A s econd  i n t e r e s t i n g  p o i n t  to  emerge from t h i s  c a se  s tu d y  i s  
t h a t  th e  most  common j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f f e r e d  by b o t h  p a r t i e s  to  the  
d i s p u t e  was t h a t  e a c h  was d e f e n d in g  the  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  
s o v e r e i g n t y .  A l though  T a n z a n ia  c o u ld  have a rg u e d  i t  was 
u n d e r t a k i n g  a h u m a n i t a r i a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  N yerere  i n s i s t e d  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h a t  T a n z a n ia  was t a k i n g  p u n i t i v e  a c t i o n  f o r  a p r e v i o u s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .
I t  would a p p e a r  f rom t h i s  example t h a t  the  fu n d a m e n ta l  
p r i n c i p l e  g o v e rn in g  th e  a c t i o n s  of the  p a r t i e s  i n v o l v e d  was a 
c a l c u l a t i o n  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  and t h a t  no s t a t e  v o l u n t a r i l y  
r e s t r a i n e d  i t s  b e h a v i o u r  f o r  th e  d e fen ce  o f  a h i g h e r  p r i n c i p l e .  
While d e f e n d i n g  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  was a f a c t o r  in 
c e r t a i n  s t a t e s '  c a l c u l a t i o n  of where t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  l a y ,  such a s  
the  members of the  OAU, i t  c o u ld  n o t  be s a i d  t o  have had a p r im a ry  
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  any s t a t e s '  co n d u c t .  The f a c t  t h a t  "a fu ndam en ta l
C  O
p i l l a r  of  o r d e r  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i e t y  had been f l o u t e d "  d i d  
n o t  m o t i v a t e  s t a t e s  t o  d e f e n d  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y
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in the interests of promoting order within international society 
as a whole. Instead, each state's action in response to the 
dispute was based on a calculation of its own interests.
While Bull and Nardin recognise the rights of states to 
pursue their own interests, they also imply that that the 
principle of state sovereignty is the only principle states can be
C Qexpected to respect. It follows that a principle such as 
respect for human rights would always come second to the principle 
of state sovereignty in a state's calculation of its best 
interests.
Clearly, the principle of human rights did not feature in 
any state's justification of its actions in the Tanzania - Uganda 
conflict. Even though Nyerere had been a long-standing critic of 
Amin's abuses of human rights, he chose to justify what may well 
have been accepted as a "humanitarian intervention" as counter­
intervention. However, if the principle of state sovereignty was 
fundamental to a state's perception of its own interests, one 
would assume that the states which had no direct strategic 
interests to protect would have defended the principle of non­
intervention by supporting Uganda, or at least have stayed out of 
the conflict altogether. Instead, they chose to give tacit 
approval to Tanzania's action in the form of aid and diplomatic 
support to the new Ugandan regime. The reaction of these states 
to the Tanzanian intervention of Uganda thus contradicts the 
assumption that defending state sovereignty is the only principle 
states are likely to respect.
4.3 Towards An Understanding of the State
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A number of reasons could be offered for why the states who 
had nothing to lose by Tanzania's intervention in Uganda chose to 
support it. Wight, for example, suggests that in certain 
countries, statesmen are influenced by a "moral climate" of public 
opinion which forces them to act with compassion in cases of 
extreme abuses of power.^ Or it may be that when a state's 
strategic interests are not at risk, statesmen are less impelled 
to act as "evil men" in international relations. Whatever the 
reason, the states which tacitly supported the Tanzanian 
intervention clearly felt no compulsion to defend the principle of 
state sovereignty for its own sake.
The fact that a state can be "embarrassed" by association
C  1with the human rights atrocities of another state suggests the 
existence of a link between the states' perception of its 
interests and the claims of individuals for human rights. This 
evidence of a state’s "conscience" could be attributable either to 
the voluntary will of statesmen, or, as Wight suggests, be the 
product of states' responding to pressure from other interests, 
such as non-state actors, or other states. To understand the 
nature of this link, we would need to examine the structure of the 
state with a view to finding out how other factors may affect a 
state's perception of its own interests.
Taking this direction in international theory has been 
impeded by the assumption of a holistic state in the theories of 
Bull, Nardin and Beitz. The trend to depict the state as 
representative of a unity of purpose and consensus of values among 
individuals within it, derives from "the 19th Century ideal that 
nations would create states and that states would serve their
c onations". This assumption is no longer valid, either in terms
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of  s t a t e s  b e i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  nor  on th e  g rounds  of 
c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i v i s m .
The i d e a  o f  th e  s t a t e  a s  a u n i f i e d  whole owes i t s  o r i g i n s  to  
H ege l ,  who saw th e  s t a t e  a s  a means of r e c o n c i l i n g  t h e  com pet ing  
c l a i m s  of o r d e r  and  j u s t i c e  in  c i v i l  l i f e .  H e g e l i a n  h o l i s m ,  
a p p l i e d  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  p e r p e t u a t e s  a b l i n d  s p o t  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  in r e s p e c t  of r e c o g n i s i n g  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of 
c o m p e t in g  g r o u p s  w i t h i n  th e  s t a t e ,  and th e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  t h e s e  
g ro u p s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  a head of  s t a t e ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of  h i s  own 
i n t e r e s t s .
While  an e x a m i n a t o n  of  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e b a t e s  
a b o u t  th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  s t a t e  would o b v io u s ly  enhance  our  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  th e  s t a t e  in the  c o n t e x t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y ,  
t o  do so i s  beyond th e  c a p a c i t y  of t h i s  s u b - t h e s i s .  I t  would,  
however ,  be a u s e f u l  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  t o  acknowledge M i c h e l ' s  axiom 
t h a t  a l l  s o c i a l  g r o u p s ,  t h e  s t a t e  i n c l u d e d ,  p o s s e s s  an i n h e r e n t
C  A
t e n d en c y  t o  g i v e  r i s e  t o  r u l i n g  e l i t e s .  R e f l e c t i n g  b o t h  
M ic h e l s '  " I r o n  Law of  O l ig a r c h y "  and the  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  the  
sy s tem  of  s t a t e s ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  common to  a l l  s t a t e s  i s  the  
e x i s t e n c e  of  a head o f  s t a t e ,  o r  r u l i n g  e l i t e ,  who p o s s e s s e s  
s o v e r e i g n  power o v e r  th e  mass of the  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h i s  
s t r u c t u r a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  s o v e r e i g n  power h o ld s  t r u e  of a l l  s t a t e s ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  of a p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m ' s  c l a i m s  to  d e m o c r a c y . ^
R e c o g n i s in g  t h a t  s t a t e s  a r e  composed of c o m p e t in g  i n t e r e s t s  
s h o u ld  n o t  l e a d  us i n t o  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  to  
d e f i n e  the  b a s i s  upon w h ich  a s t a t e  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  c a l c u l a t e  i t s  
own i n t e r e s t s .  Levi  c a u t i o n s  a g a i n s t  a ssum ing  t h a t  b ecau se  
s t a t e s  a r e  p l u r a l i s t i c ,  and  r e p r e s e n t  com pet ing  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h a t
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these interests necessarily dictate its behaviour.^ However, as 
a first principle, we should understand the state's actions to be 
the actions of a head of state who, while not wholly reducible to 
his domestic constituency is by no means autonomous from it.
Heads of states may also be influenced by a wider constituency 
than simply their domestic populations, responding both to 
pressure from other states, either bi-laterally or multilaterally, 
and from non-state actors like amnesty International which have a 
moral authority in world affairs.
In approaching an understanding of the state in 
international theory, it may also be useful to recognise that 
maintaining the system of states is in the interests of all heads 
of states who are members of it.^ As I mentioned earlier, the 
system of states affords great economic, political and military 
power to the few individuals fortunate enough to represent 
sovereign states. It is therefore conceivable that heads of 
states may feel concerned, or "embarrassed" when the actions of 
"pariah states" threaten to undermine the respectability of the
c osystem of states as a whole.
Whether the need to defend the legitimacy of the system of 
states warrants the "tacit support" given to Tanzania when it 
sought to expel Idi Amin from the system of states would probably 
depend on the strength of other strategic interests. However, 
the evidence that heads of states can be "embarrassed" by the 
atrocities of another head of state suggests that the need to 
defend the legitimacy of a system which provides the source of 
their power, may be a factor in a state's evaluation of where its 
interests lie. Thus the "tacit approval" given by many states to 
Tanzania's intervention of Uganda may well have been motivated by
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t h e  need  f o r  heads  of  s t a t e s  t o  d e fe n d  th e  " r e s p e c t a b i l i t y "  o f  a 
sy s tem  which  works so e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  l e g i t i m i s e  t h e i r  own power 
a n d  p o s i t i o n .
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CONCLUSION
W h i l e  t h e  t h e o r i e s  o f  w o r l d  o r d e r  d e v e l o p e d  by  B u l l ,  N a r d i n  
a n d  B e i t z  a r g u e  t h a t  m a i n t a i n i n g  o r d e r  am ong  s t a t e s  w i l l  p r o m o t e  
t h e  common g o o d  w i t h i n  t h e m ,  t h e y  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  an 
a d e q u a t e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  b a s i s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  b e c a u s e  
o f  e r r o n e o u s  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  s t a t e .  The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  a s  a  v o l u n t a r y  a c t o r  i n  w o r l d  a f f a i r s ,  c a p a b l e  o f  a c t i n g  
a g a i n s t  i t s  own  i n t e r e s t s  f o r  t h e  good  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  a s  a who le  
o f f e r s  no  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  f a c t o r s  w h i c h  may i n f l u e n c e  
a s t a t e ' s  b e h a v i o u r .  W h i l e  B u l l ,  N a r d i n  a n d  B e i t z  w o u l d  a r g u e  
t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p e a c e f u l  c o e x i s t e n c e  c u r r e n t l y  e n j o y e d  among 
s t a t e s  i s  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  s t a t e s '  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  " r u l e s "  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r ,  i t  c o u l d  e q u a l l y  be a r g u e d  t h a t  a s t a t e ' s  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p u r s u e  i t s  g o a l s  v i a  c o o p e r a t i v e  m e a n s  i s  t h e  
p r o d u c t  o f  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s .
B u l l ,  N a r d i n  a n d  B e i t z  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  s t a t e  a s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  
u n i t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  a n d  a t t e m p t  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  
m a i n t a i n i n g  o r d e r  am ong  s t a t e s  w i l l  p r o m o t e  t h e  common good f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h i n  t h e m .  H o w e v e r ,  p o r t r a y i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
s t a t e s  a n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  
i n c o m p a t i b l e  i g n o r e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s t a t e s  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  
p r i n c i p l e s  l i k e  hum an  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  own 
i n t e r e s t s .
To h a v e  a n y  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l u e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e o r y  m u s t  
b e g i n  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s t a t e s  w i t h  a v i e w  t o  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  how a r a n g e  o f  f a c t o r s  c a n  i n f l u e n c e  a  s t a t e ' s  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s .  The d i r e c t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  
r e s e a r c h  s h o u l d  b e  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  s t a t e s  i n  l i g h t  o f
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the many influences, both internal and external, upon the state's 
evaluation of its own interests. A state's calculation of its 
self-interest might therefore include pressure from domestic 
constituencies, or from other states, or from non-state 
"authorities" such as Amnesty International. Recognising that 
many non-state actors have an increasing authority in 
international affairs should not, however, lead to the conclusion 
that the presence of such influences renders the state's power in 
any way reduced.*
The state is clearly a fundamental unit of world order and a 
dominant force in international politics. We should therefore 
attempt to develop a strong, working definition of the state which 
acknowledges the range of interests, both internal and external, 
state and non-state, which influence its behaviour. While such 
an analysis should recognise the differences between states in 
terms of race, ethnicity, political structures and geo-historical 
traditions, it should also acknowledge the structural factors 
common to all states, many of which derive from a state's 
membership of the system of states. A feature common to all 
states, for example, is the power afforded to heads of states vis 
a vis the majority of the population.
Further work in developing a theory of world order in the 
direction suggested above might be guided by the proposition 
developed in this sub-thesis that the state is not a unified whole 
but a coalition of competing interests, the most fundmental of 
which is the division between a state's population and its 
sovereign ruler.
The outcome of research guided by this proposition need not
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challenge the idea that "the states system provides the present 
structure of the political organisation of mankind... and such 
hopes as we may entertain for the emergence of a more cohesive 
world society are bound up with its preservation and
odevelopment". Far from undermining the state-centric conception 
of world order, we would instead arrive at a better understanding 
of the state in international theory, free of the limitations of a 
conception which depicts the state as an autonomous, voluntary 
actor in international affairs.
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p .  295
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